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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jesse Stocker King 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Marketing 
 
June 2011 
 
Title: The Affect Heuristic in Consumer Evaluations 
 
Approved:  _______________________________________________ 
David Boush 
 
This dissertation examines the role of affect in consumer judgments in two essays. 
The first essay explores the use of affect as a heuristic basis for judgments of the risks 
and benefits associated with new products. Current perspectives regarding the processes 
by which consumers make decisions about the adoption of innovations maintain that it is 
largely a cognitive process. However, the four studies that make up the first essay suggest 
that consumer assessments of the risks and benefits associated with product innovations 
are often inversely related and affectively congruent with evaluations of those 
innovations. The results support and extend previous research that has investigated the 
affect heuristic in the context of social hazards. The findings further indicate that more 
affectively extreme evaluations are associated with increasingly disparate assessments of 
risk and benefit. The results indicate that this relationship is consistent across a variety of 
products and product categories. Together, these findings challenge traditional 
conceptualizations of innovation adoption decision making and suggest that cognitive 
models alone are insufficient to explain innovation adoption decisions.  
The second essay investigates if processing fluency – the difficulty associated 
with processing information – may serve as an input to the affect heuristic and 
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subsequent judgments of risk and benefit. Recently, Song and Schwarz investigated the 
relationship between differences in fluency and perceptions of risk.  Their results 
suggested that fluency experiences influence risk perception through differences in 
familiarity and not as the result of fluency-elicited affect. The three studies included in 
the second essay re-examine those results in an effort to clarify the role of affect as a 
basis for perceptions of risk. The findings document a previously unreported reversal in 
preference for less fluent stimuli and suggest that fluency-elicited affect can explain the 
relationship between processing experiences and perceptions of risk. The results have 
important theoretical implications for our understanding of how people derive meaning 
from fluency experiences and for the role of fluency-elicited affect as a basis for 
judgments of risk and benefit. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Last year Apple began selling its newest product, the iPad. On the day of its release, 
thousands of consumers camped out in front of Apple stores while thousands more 
anxiously awaited shipments from pre-orders placed months earlier. Apple sent bloggers, 
reporters and other influential members of the media devices in advance of the launch so 
that their reviews would be ready to fuel the already prodigious hype surrounding the 
new product. As the reviews came out, they were decidedly mixed. Interestingly, the 
reviews - rather than balancing the pros and cons and offering an indefinite opinion - 
were split. Some commentators lauded the device and predicted that it signaled the 
dawning of a new age of computing. Others chastised it for lacking features and dumbing 
down the user interface. In opening his review for the New York Times, David Pogue 
(2010) wrote: “In 10 years of reviewing products for the New York Times, I’ve never 
seen a product as polarizing as Apple’s iPad…”. Rather than try to find a middle ground 
between the two extremes, Pogue went on to write his review from two perspectives.  
One, targeted at “regular people” was favorable, while the other intended for “techies” 
was negative.  
Previous innovation adoption research would explain the polarized evaluations of 
the iPad as being the result of one of several bottom-up, analytical processes. In general, 
more analytical explanations would argue that reviewers first acquired knowledge about 
the features, risks and benefits of the iPad then integrated that information to form a 
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judgment. For example, they might assign weights based on importance, then using these 
weighted attributes, sum the advantages and disadvantages offered by the product to form 
an opinion. However, recent work in other domains suggests that like many other 
judgments, evaluations of innovations could also occur through a top-down, affective 
process. This perspective suggests that the reviewers of the iPad may have first formed a 
feeling toward the product and then assessed the benefits and risks associated with the 
device to be congruent with their underlying affective evaluation (i.e. I like/dislike it). In 
this dissertation, a series of studies are proposed to explore the role of affect in consumer 
judgments of products. Each of these studies is expected to provide evidence that affect 
often underlies consumer evaluations. More specifically, it is proposed that consumers 
apply an affect heuristic when making judgments about a newly encountered product and 
its attributes. This research further investigates how consumers select among naïve 
theories to interpret their experiences processing information and how these inferences 
may serve as one potential input to the affect heuristic.  The findings of this dissertation 
make a substantive contribution by demonstrating that analytical factors alone are not 
sufficient to explain the process by which consumers form evaluations of new products.  
A more comprehensive understanding of this process can be gained by also considering 
the role of affective decision making processes. 
This dissertation is divided into two essays, each composed of several studies. The 
first essay addresses the question of how affect influences consumer judgments of the 
risks and benefits associated with innovations. Previous research from other domains 
(e.g. Alhakami and Slovic 1994; Finucane et al. 2000) suggests that like other uncertain 
judgments, consumers will perceive these attributes to be inversely related. This inverse 
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relationship is thought to occur because people apply an affect heuristic (Finucane et al. 
2000) when forming their judgments. The affect heuristic is based on the idea that when 
making a judgment, it is more efficient for people to rely upon their overall affective 
impression of an object than it is for them to account for all available information.   
Empirical work surrounding the affect heuristic has largely been limited to evaluations of 
objects about which study participants had some knowledge or prior attitudes. For 
example, the work of Finucane et al. (2000) focused on the risks and benefits of social 
hazards, such as nuclear power, pesticides and food preservatives. To date, few studies 
have explored affect as a basis of risk and benefit evaluations using unfamiliar stimuli.  
Those that have, were limited to evaluations of financial products (e.g. Ganzach 2000; 
MacGregor et al. 2000).  The research detailed in this dissertation provides evidence that 
consumers also turn to their feelings and rely upon the affect heuristic to form affectively 
congruent evaluations of new products, about which they have no prior attitude or 
knowledge. The results indicate that new products that are liked tend to be evaluated as 
being beneficial with few risks. Whereas, innovations that are disliked elicit the opposite 
pattern – consumers tend to see them as risky and offering few benefits.   
These findings make three important contributions to the consumer decision 
making literature. First, they demonstrate that consumers rely upon their feelings when 
other information is not available, lending further support to the idea that the affect 
heuristic does not depend on the retrieval of previously formed cognitive evaluations.  
Second, evidence of these relationships in a consumer context is important because 
previous empirical work on the affect heuristic has been published almost exclusively in 
psychology journals. This work has yet to make inroads to the consumer behavior 
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literature. Both of the essays in this dissertation proposal represent an initial attempt to 
integrate the methodology and theoretical insight developed in other literatures with 
current consumer behavior research and highlight the role of the affect heuristic in 
consumer decision making. A final contribution of the first essay is evidence supporting 
the use of affect in judgments of new products. These findings address a critical gap in 
the innovation adoption literature. Previous research on innovation adoption decisions 
has been heavily focused on analytical factors (Wood and Moreau 2006). For example, 
researchers have identified product attributes such as complexity, relative advantage, 
compatibility etc. that influence the diffusion of innovations through a marketplace. At an 
individual level, new product adoption decisions have been characterized as an 
uncertainty reduction process that takes place over time (Rogers 2003). While consumer 
attitudes developed during this process are recognized as being affective (e.g. 
favorable/unfavorable), their formation is conceptualized as a bottom up, analytical 
process in which consumers become “psychologically involved with the innovation” 
actively seeking out and integrating information to form an attitude (Rogers 2003, pg. 
175). The studies from both essays of this dissertation forward an alternative perspective 
that considers the role of intuitive, affective decision making in consumer decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty. In the first essay, it is acknowledged that while analytical 
factors can influence judgments, consumer evaluations of innovations can also occur 
through an affect driven, top down process. The findings of the first essay provide 
evidence that consumers use the affect heuristic when evaluating new products and 
identifies contexts that moderate reliance on the affect heuristic. 
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If consumers rely on affect when forming judgments of new products, the logical 
next question to ask is where might this affect originate? Associative memory models 
would suggest that one source of affect may be the result of the retrieval of affect laced 
conceptual information learned from past encounters with similar products. However, this 
conceptual information is likely to be idosyncratic, variable across both individuals and 
products. A second potential source of affect is the ease or difficulty associated with 
processing information.  
The second essay further addresses the role of affect in consumer decision making 
by exploring the question of how the experience of processing information might 
contribute to the affect that consumers use to make evaluations of novel stimuli. Research 
has shown that metacognitions (thoughts about thinking) regarding the relative ease or 
difficulty experienced as consumers process information (fluency) can influence 
judgment beyond the content of the information that is processed (Schwarz et al. 1991). 
Fluency research has consistently shown that fluent processing experiences lead to 
favorable evaluations (e.g. Schwarz 2004). However, a number of researchers have 
suggested that the actual meaning of a processing experience may be open to 
interpretation based on the naïve theories that consumers apply (Alter and Oppenheimer 
2009). Recently, researchers have begun to report reversals in the interpretation of 
fluency experiences and demonstrate conditions under which difficult to process 
(disfluent) stimuli are preferred over easily processed (fluent) stimuli. These reversals 
have been achieved by instructing participants to apply specific naïve theories (Briñol, 
Petty, and Tormala 2006), by priming different goals (Labroo and Kim 2009) by 
manipulating the way by which information is processed (Nielsen and Escalas 2010), by 
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manipulating construal level (Tsai and McGill 2011), and by varying the consumption 
domain (Pocheptsova, Labroo, and Dhar 2010). However, this research has yet to 
investigate how reversals in preference due to the application of different naïve theories 
might influence perceptions of risk and benefit. In this dissertation, three studies 
demonstrate that goals held by consumers can influence the naïve theories consumers 
select to apply to the interpretation of a processing experience. When consumer goals 
suggest that difficulty experienced while processing information leads towards goal 
advancement, disfluent stimuli are preferred over fluent stimuli. However, if consumer 
goals suggest the opposite, fluent stimuli are preferred over disfluent stimuli.  
Importantly, findings from the second essay suggest that favorable affect resulting from 
fluency experiences can serve as an important source of information for judgments of risk 
and benefit. The exact nature of the relationship between favorable affective evaluations 
and perceptions of risk, however, appears to depend on the goals held by consumers.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS  
 
As a whole, this research has important implications for practitioners developing 
and releasing innovations into the marketplace and for understanding how consumers 
form evaluations of risk. A major purpose of this research is to highlight the importance 
of affective, decision making styles in consumer evaluations of new products. For 
marketers, such findings help to provide an answer to several important questions. First, 
the affect heuristic helps to answer the question of why first impressions matter.  A 
failure to create a favorable initial impression during the launch of a new product or 
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brand will likely negatively bias subsequent evaluations of the object’s attributes.  
Similarly, for market researchers testing product concepts, these findings provide an 
explanation for why consumers often find it difficult to objectively evaluate really new 
products (Hoeffler 2003). Rather than forming their attitudes by first understanding the 
attributes of the product, consumers may look to their initial affective evaluation, then 
pattern their responses in an affectively congruent fashion. This implies that marketers 
testing new product concepts should be aware that a concerted effort may be required in 
order to get research participants to analytically evaluate a new product. Further, the way 
in which new product concepts are presented to consumers may affect their subsequent 
evaluations. Concepts that are easy to understand may trigger different evaluations than 
concepts that are more difficult to understand. The influence of these processing 
experiences may also be moderated by individual differences or by instructing 
participants to visualize different goals or usage situations. Complex or difficult to 
understand products can be evaluated more favorably by consumers who hold goals that 
promote a favorable interpretation of disfluent processing, whereas the reverse is true for 
those who hold goals that trigger a negative interpretation of disfluent processing. With 
these findings, marketers could tailor persuasive messages to specific products and usage 
situations. 
This dissertation also addresses the question of why some attributes of a product are 
capable of compensating for others. The affect heuristic centers on the idea that decision 
makers turn to affect, employing a top down strategy to form affectively congruent 
evaluations. If this type of strategy is used, specific risks (or benefits) of a product may 
be overlooked if the product’s overall evaluation is favorable (unfavorable). For 
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marketers, this distinction may hold real implications. If consumer evaluations of a 
product’s attributes are biased by their holistic evaluation of the product, then 
communications emphasizing attributes that increase overall favorability of a product 
(e.g. increase benefits) would be expected to produce affectively congruent changes in 
evaluations of attributes which may be completely unrelated (e.g. decrease risks). In 
developing communications, marketers may be able to rely on consumers to form 
affectively congruent inferences about the risks and benefits associated with a product 
without addressing them directly. Further, marketing communications that appropriately 
match ease of processing with goals held by consumers may be capable of increasing 
preference for products that are perceived as risky choices. 
 Finally, this research offers practitioners an explanation for why consumers often 
reach different conclusions from similar experiences. In the second essay, consumers 
with different goals are shown to apply different naïve theories to interpret their 
processing experiences. Applied to the example of the iPad introduced earlier, such a 
finding suggests that “techies” might have interpreted their fluent experiences with the 
iPad’s new user interface negatively because simplified software prevents them from 
reaching customized solutions to complex tasks. However “regular people” are likely to 
have different goals and may have selected a different naïve theory which led them to 
interpret greater ease of use as advancement towards a goal. 
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SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
 
 A total of seven studies are reported in the two essays that follow. In the first 
essay, I describe four studies that explore the use of the affect heuristic in consumer 
evaluations of product innovations. The results of study 1 demonstrate an inverse 
relationship between perceptions of risk and benefit surrounding innovations. The affect 
heuristic is conceptualized as a more efficient decision making style and as such is 
expected to be favored over more analytical styles when mental resources are constrained 
or when motivation is low. To explore this idea, participants in the first study were 
assigned to a control condition, an analytical evaluation condition, or a working memory 
load condition. In the analytical condition, participants were asked to identify and rank 
the risks and benefits associated with each product before forming their evaluations. It 
was hypothesized that the relationship between risk and benefit would be weaker in the 
analytical evaluation compared to the control condition. In contrast, it was expected that 
the inverse relationship between risks and benefits would be strengthened when the 
cognitive resources available to participants are constrained by a working memory load.   
The results of the first study generally support these hypotheses. Perceptions of risk and 
benefit were found to be significantly less related among participants assigned to the 
analytical evaluation condition as compared to the other two conditions. 
 The second study examined the affect heuristic from a different perspective.  In 
this study, participants were first asked to evaluate a product. Then after completing a 
separate experiment they were presented with information about only the risks or benefits 
of the product and changes in the non-manipulated attribute were measured. The findings 
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indicated that participants changed their evaluations of the non-manipulated attribute in 
an affectively congruent manner, despite the absence of a logical relationship. For 
example, a participant who was given information intended to increase the favorability of 
a new product (e.g. information that increased benefit perception or decreased risk 
perception) usually inferred an affectively congruent change in the non-manipulated 
attribute (e.g. decreased risk perception /increased benefit perception). The same, 
affectively congruent pattern was found for information intended to decrease favorability 
of the product (e.g. information that increased risk perception or decreased benefit 
perception). This change in the non-manipulated attribute demonstrates that participants 
rely upon a common affective evaluation rather than a purely analytical assessment of 
information. 
 The third study of essay 1 manipulated affective evaluations more directly and 
measured differences in risk and benefit evaluations. In this study, participants were 
given information intended to increase or decrease their affective evaluation of an 
innovation relative to a control group. The results demonstrated that increases in the 
extremity of participant’s affective response corresponded with greater differences in 
judgments of risk and benefit. Neutral evaluations (e.g. neither like nor dislike) were 
found to correspond with smaller risk benefit differences than more strongly valenced 
responses (e.g. strongly like or strongly dislike). 
 The fourth study explored contexts that had the potential to moderate the use of 
the affect heuristic. Previous research suggests that products that are more utilitarian may 
be evaluated using more analytical processes than products that are more hedonic in 
nature (Yeung and Wyer Jr 2004). Participants in the fourth study were asked to evaluate 
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a series of innovations on a number of attributes to see which, if any, might moderate the 
relationship between affective evaluations and differences between perceived risk and 
benefit.  None of the product level attributes considered in this study were found to 
moderate the use of the affect heuristic. One possible interpretation of these findings is 
that product level attributes may not influence the extent to which consumers rely upon 
affect when forming judgments of risk and benefit. Rather, consumers may turn to affect 
as a default when making judgments of products about which they have little information. 
 The second essay is comprised of three additional studies. These studies test the 
hypotheses (1) that processing experiences (fluency) can be used as an input to affective 
evaluations as well as judgments of risk and benefit; and, (2) that processing experiences 
have different meaning depending on the goals held by consumers. The first hypothesis 
relates directly to the studies proposed in the first essay. If affect plays an important role 
in the formation of evaluations of new products then it is important to understand the 
processes that contribute to these feelings. The second hypothesis addresses this issue, 
suggesting that the goals held by consumers may influence the way in which consumers 
interpret the experience of processing information, potentially reversing preferences.  
In the first two studies of the second essay, participants were asked to imagine 
that they were visiting an amusement park and were handed a brochure with the names of 
the rides offered. Those assigned to a risk-seeking goal condition were further instructed 
to imagine that they wanted to identify those rides that would be the most exciting and 
adventurous on the basis of a brochure so that they would not waste time on the dull ones. 
Those assigned to the risk-avoidance condition were instructed to imagine that they were 
visiting the amusement park on a day when they were not feeling well and that they 
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wanted to avoid rides that are too risky and adventurous and hence the most likely to 
make them sick. Participants then encountered a list with ride names that differed in how 
easy or difficult they were to pronounce. In the first study, this fluency manipulation was 
conducted between subjects and in the second study participants were presented with 
both fluent and disfluent ride names. 
The results suggest that judgments based upon fluency are often comparative 
rather than absolute in nature. Between subjects manipulations of fluency and goals 
(study 1) resulted in no significant differences in favorable affect, risk or benefit among 
the ride names. However, when fluency was manipulated within subjects (participants 
saw both easy and difficult to pronounce names; studies 2 and 3), a significant interaction 
was found between goals and fluency in favorability evaluations of the rides and in 
perceptions of benefits. As predicted, easily pronounced ride names were more favorably 
evaluated relative to more difficult to pronounce ride names among risk avoiders.  
However among risk seekers, favorable affective evaluations reversed and difficult to 
pronounce ride names were evaluated more favorably than easily pronounced ride names.   
Benefit perceptions closely followed favorable affect and a goals x fluency 
interaction was observed for perceptions of benefit. Importantly, as predicted by the 
affect heuristic, favorable affect was found to be predictor of both risk and benefit. The 
regression results indicated that more favorable affective evaluations corresponded with 
increased benefit and decreased of risk. However, the strength of the relationships was 
found to vary based upon differences in goals and processing difficulty. The relationship 
between favorable affect and risk was found to differ depending on whether participants 
held risk-avoidance or risk-seeking goals. Among risk avoiders, favorable affect and risk 
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were negatively related (e.g. more favorable names were perceived as being less risky).  
However, this relationship was attenuated among risk seekers. This pattern of results 
matches what would be expected by the affect heuristic if risks were viewed as more 
desirable among risk seekers relative to risk avoiders.  
The third study of the second essay confirmed these findings in a different 
context. Rather than amusement park rides, participants in the third study were asked to 
imagine that someone they knew had been diagnosed with a serious medical condition 
and that the physician had suggested medications that could be taken to treat the illness. 
In the risk-seeking goal condition, participants were instructed to imagine that the person 
who was sick wanted to get well as soon as possible and that they should try to identify 
the strongest medications to help treat the illness. Conversely, participants in the risk-
avoidance goal condition were instructed that they should imagine that the person who 
was sick often has had complications when taking medications and that they should try to 
identify the safest medications to treat their condition. Participants then evaluated a list of 
three easy to pronounce medications (brand name) and three difficult to pronounce 
medications (generic). 
 The results of the third study closely aligned with those from study two. A goals 
x fluency interaction was found on favorable affective evaluations of the medication 
names. Difficult to pronounce drug names were evaluated more favorably by risk seekers 
than among risk avoiders. A similar interaction was found among benefit perceptions.  
Difficult to pronounce medications were found to have more benefits among risk seekers 
than among risk avoiders. As predicted by the affect heuristic, favorable affective 
evaluations were found to be negatively related to risk and positively related to benefit. 
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Again however, the relationship between favorable affective evaluations and risk was 
found to be attenuated among risk seekers relative to risk avoiders.  
Overall, the results of the studies that make up the second essay demonstrate that 
the meaning derived from the ease or difficulty of processing information depends on the 
naïve theories that are applied to interpret the experience. Difficulty associated with 
processing information was shown to trigger different affective evaluations depending on 
which goals were salient. Evidence from these studies indicated that fluency-elicited 
affect is related to risk and benefit in a pattern that is consistent with what would be 
expected if participants relied upon affect as a heuristic. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ESSAY 1: THE AFFECT HEURISTIC IN CONSUMER EVALUATIONS OF 
PRODUCT INNOVATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Established conceptualizations maintain that analytical cognitive processes 
dominate innovation adoption decisions. This emphasis likely stems from the field’s 
economic origins and the early interest in modeling and forecasting innovation diffusion 
rates at the market level. Whereas these analytical theories have long served as the 
primary explanation for individual level innovation adoption decisions (Rogers 1995, 
2003), alternative models of decision making have received broad support in both the 
psychology and consumer behavior literatures. These models maintain that while 
individuals are capable of making analytical decisions, affect and emotion often play an 
important role in judgment and decision making (Kardes, Posavac, and Cronley 2004; 
Lowenstein et al. 2001). The research below, explores the influence of affect in consumer 
evaluations of innovations, specifically proposing that consumers rely upon affect as a 
heuristic when assessing the risks and benefits associated with an innovation. 
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Innovation Adoption Decisions 
 
Theories governing decisions about the adoption of innovations suggest that it is 
fundamentally an uncertainty reduction process (Mahajan, Muller, and Bass 1990; Rogers 
1995). As customers gain an increased understanding of an innovation, they are better 
able to assess its benefits. In this view, an adoption decision occurs after a potential 
customer gathers enough information to be able to assess the relative advantage of an 
innovation against existing alternatives, taking into account any remaining uncertainty. 
Previous research has shown that product and social attributes moderate the speed with 
which an innovation diffuses through a marketplace (Rogers 2003). 
Rogers (2003) describes the process surrounding the decision to adopt an 
innovation as evolving over time: 
“Diffusion scholars have long recognized that an individual’s decision about an 
innovation is not an instantaneous act. Rather it is a process that occurs over time 
and consists of a series of different actions.” (169, emphasis in original) 
Briefly, the model describing this process consists of a series of five decision-making 
steps. A potential consumer first gains knowledge about the existence of an innovation 
and how it functions, then is persuaded by the attributes of the innovation that lead to an 
analytical formation of a positive or negative attitude toward the product. The customer 
then proceeds to make a decision, implement their decision, and ultimately re-evaluate 
and confirm their decision. 
 Following this description, a customer’s evaluation of an innovation would appear 
to follow a very rational hierarchy of effects (Palda 1966). Consumers who become 
 17 
 
 
“psychologically involved with the innovation” (Rogers 2003, 175) actively seek out 
additional information and compare what they have learned about the innovation to 
existing market offerings. When consumers acquire new information, they integrate it 
with existing knowledge to refine their attitudes. As information accumulates, the 
consumer becomes increasingly confident about the benefits expected from the 
innovation. In this model, the consumer carefully gathers and considers information then 
forms a well-reasoned, analytical evaluation of the innovation. A key element in this line 
of thought is that consumers form attitudes through the reduction of uncertainty. While 
these attitudes are conceptualized as affective in nature, their formation occurs through a 
bottom-up analytical process in which consumers carefully consider all available 
information. This perspective shares a number of similarities to Fishbein’s expectancy-
value model (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) in which attitudes are realized as the 
consequence of cognitively assessing an individual’s beliefs about some object.  
Innovation research has also evaluated adoption decisions from an information 
processing perspective, primarily focusing on uncovering individual differences that 
might explain the reasons that certain groups of consumers choose to adopt innovations 
(Gatignon and Robertson 1991; Manning, Bearden, and Madden 1995; Wood and Swait 
2002). For example, a sizeable quantity of research has focused on defining and 
measuring the concept of consumer innovativeness—a consumer’s propensity to adopt 
new products (Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin 2006; Hirschman 1980). As another example, 
Moreau, Lehmann and Markman (2001) used individual differences to investigate how 
prior knowledge about related products influences the way information about new 
products is processed. 
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Other work, developed outside the innovation adoption literature, offers an 
alternative perspective to how individuals make decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty. This research credits individuals as being capable of making analytical 
decisions, but suggests that they are often biased and rely on heuristics (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974).  
A small but growing area of innovation adoption research has begun to consider 
the implications of heuristics and biases research. For example, research has 
demonstrated that the accessibility of mental simulations can bias evaluations of new 
products. Mental simulations are thought to aid consumers in assessing benefits and costs 
of new products. These judgments are then used to form an evaluation of the product as a 
whole. Specifically, the effect of mental simulations on evaluations of new products has 
been shown to be influenced by the novelty of the product, variations in how research 
participants are instructed to visualize using a new product (Dahl and Hoeffler 2004; 
Zhao, Hoeffler, and Dahl 2009) and the provision of information about the product 
(Ziamou and Ratneshwar 2002). Mental simulation research has not investigated affect as 
an antecedent to assessments of risks and benefits.  
However, related theory based on clinical results (Damasio 2000) suggests that, in 
part, people make decisions by relying on emotions created from the recall of emotionally 
marked images. The positive and negative markers associated with these images affect 
decision making by influencing whether people like one option over another. The 
influence of these emotions is largely unconscious, and occurs automatically as 
individuals anticipate the consequence of a decision.  
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Forwarding this idea, Swartz and Clore (1996) have proposed that people use 
feelings as inputs for decisions because they often contain useful information. Pham et al. 
(2001) applied this affect as information framework to demonstrate differences in reason-
based versus affect-based judgments toward advertising. Their findings indicated that 
affective judgments are often faster, more consistent across individuals, and more 
predictive of thoughts toward a target than reason-based judgments. These results are 
particularly relevant to the present research because they suggest that affect can precede 
cognition and act to valence subsequent thoughts regarding a target. The authors’ state:  
“Feelings are often instantiated upon exposure to a target. Once instantiated, these 
feelings then frame subsequent thought generation through the spontaneous 
priming of feeling-consistent cognitions and the controlled retrieval of knowledge 
that helps explain the initial feeling response.” (Pham et al. 2001, 185) 
Judgment and decision making research has increasingly recognized the important role of 
affect. Some researchers have gone so far as to propose that all cognitive appraisals are 
laced with emotion, but that the converse is not true, experienced emotions do not 
necessarily elicit cognitive processing (Zajonc 1980). However, the influence of affect 
and emotion in the innovation adoption process has been largely overlooked. One 
exception is Wood and Moreau (2006) who demonstrated that negative and positive 
emotions can arise as consumers first learn to use an innovation. In two studies, they 
found that novices, but not experienced consumers, improve the accuracy of their 
predictions about how difficult it will be to learn to use a new product when provided a 
demonstration of the product.  It was shown that the disconfirmation of complexity 
expectations as consumers first use innovations can trigger emotions that subsequently 
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influence post trial product evaluations. The present research differs from that of Wood 
and Moreau (2006) by considering the importance of affect much earlier in the adoption 
process, elicited in response to the initial presentation of an innovation.  
Slovic et al. (2007) provide a guide in this respect, by suggesting that individuals 
use an affect heuristic when making judgments. The affect heuristic is based on the idea 
that when making a judgment, it is more efficient for people to rely upon their overall 
affective impression of an object than it is for them to analytically weigh all available 
information. Evidence for the affect heuristic has been provided by studies demonstrating 
that both benefit and risk perceptions toward some target can be explained, in particular 
contexts, by a subject’s more general affect toward the target. That is, affect is 
experienced prior to judgments of risk and benefit and has a direct influence on 
subsequent cognitive appraisals (Slovic et al. 2007; Zajonc 1980).  
Considering an affect heuristic as an antecedent to risk assessment is directly 
applicable to innovation research because risk is among the most salient factors thought 
to influence innovation adoption decisions. Innovations are labeled as such because they 
contain an idea which is judged as new from the perspective of the potential adoptee 
(Rogers 1995).  The received view holds that exposure to novelty results in uncertainty 
regarding the benefits offered by a product; costs associated with this uncertainty 
represent the risk inherent in its adoption.  Adoption risk may emanate from a myriad of 
sources including switching costs, social and personal disappointment, hidden ownership 
costs, unknown quality attributes, the potential for physical harm, and uncertainty in 
service delivery (Ram and Sheth 1989). The unknown potential for these and other costs 
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can be thought to increase the subjective assessment of risk inherent in the adoption of an 
innovation.  
However, the work of Alhakami and Slovic (1994) as well as Finucane et al. 
(2000) suggests that in many situations people perceive risks and benefits to be inversely 
related. A plausible explanation of this inverse relationship is that the assessment of both 
risk and benefit may be derived from an underlying affective evaluation (like/dislike). 
Consumers draw upon this affect and use it to form congruent inferences about other 
attributes. Liking an object, therefore, promotes a favorable assessment of benefits, and a 
deflated assessment of risks. Disliking produces the opposite pattern. Finucane et al. 
(2000) demonstrated that by placing participants under time pressure, reliance on 
affective evaluations could be increased, producing a stronger inverse relationship 
between judgments of risk and benefit. Additionally, they demonstrated that 
manipulations that either increase or decrease perceptions of risk or benefit generally 
produce an inverse, affectively congruent change in the non-manipulated attribute. This 
pattern of results has been demonstrated under circumstances in which information about 
risks (benefits) is logically devoid of benefit (risk) information. A change in a 
participant’s affective evaluation (increased/decreased favorability) was implicated for 
this finding. 
Past research on the affect heuristic has primarily focused on evaluations of the 
risks and benefits associated with broadly defined hazardous technologies (e.g., food 
preservatives, nuclear power and pesticides) and activities (e.g., fire fighting, air travel 
and surgery) in reference to how they would impact society as a whole (Alhakami and 
Slovic 1994). Little research to date has been directed towards investigating the role of 
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affect in evaluations of novel stimuli. Previous studies which have used novel stimuli 
focused on financial decisions (Ganzach 2000; MacGregor et al. 2000) and found 
evidence that affect may play an important role.  For example, Ganzach (2000) conducted 
four studies and demonstrated that, even among people who are well trained at analyzing 
stock markets, estimates of the risks and returns associated with unfamiliar stock indexes 
tend to be negatively related and congruent with their global preferences for the assets. 
Similarly, Macgregor et al. (2000) investigated the role of imagery and affect in decisions 
about initial public offerings (IPOs). Their results indicated that affective evaluations of 
various industries were positively related to expected future returns, as well as 
participants’ estimates of how likely they would be to invest in those industries. The 
authors concluded that while an investor’s affective evaluation may not be an accurate 
basis for prospective judgments it is nonetheless influential in decisions related to 
unfamiliar financial assets.   
The research reported here is the first to propose that consumers also turn to their 
feelings to form affectively congruent judgments of product innovations. The results of 
the studies below expand the range of application of the affect heuristic and advance 
understanding about the process by which consumers make decisions about innovations. 
Consistent with use of the affect heuristic, innovations that are liked will be evaluated as 
being beneficial with few risks. Whereas, innovations that are disliked will elicit the 
opposite pattern—consumers will see them as risky and offering few benefits. Evidence 
of such a pattern of evaluations is important for two reasons. First, demonstrating an 
inverse relationship among judgments of risk and benefit of novel stimuli (innovations) 
would provide evidence that consumers turn to their feelings when other information is 
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not available. Such a finding would further support the idea that the affect heuristic does 
not depend on the retrieval of previously formed analytical evaluations as the stimuli 
employed in the studies presented below consist of products and concepts that 
participants have not previously seen. Thus, a demonstration of an inverse risk/benefit 
relationship among these products could not be attributable to participants retrieving 
evaluations formed at an earlier time. This inverse relationship also has specific 
marketing implications.  
    Second, this research attempts to provide an important demonstration of the 
affect heuristic in a consumer context. As detailed above, past research has largely 
conceptualized decision making about innovations as an analytical process resulting from 
the consideration of attributes (benefits and risks) associated with an innovation. In 
contrast, the affect heuristic suggests a top down process in which consumers rely upon 
affect as a source of information when forming judgments about an innovation’s 
attributes. The use of a consumer context is also important because judgments are 
directed towards specific objects rather than broad social hazards (e.g., food preservatives 
in general) that have been used in previous research (Alhakami and Slovic 1994; 
Finucane et al. 2000). Innovation adoption decisions are typically in regard to a specific 
product and are made under inherently uncertain conditions. Finally, as recommended by 
previous research (Alhakami and Slovic 1994) participants in the studies presented below 
are asked to make evaluations from an individual perspective (e.g., give your opinion) 
rather than for society as a whole (e.g., for United States or Australian society). Such a 
perspective mirrors typical consumer evaluations and may be easier than forming 
judgments about the effect of an activity or technology on society as a whole.  
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Hypotheses  
 
Based on the discussion above, affect surrounding the evaluation of an innovation 
is expected to influence an individual’s judgments of the risks and benefits of an 
innovation. These assessments would be expected to subsequently affect customers’ 
attitudes and cognitive appraisals of the innovation. This line of reasoning leads to the 
first hypothesis. 
H1:  Participants will judge the risks and benefits of an innovation to be 
inversely related. 
Evidence of a negatively correlated risk/benefit relationship would suggest that 
innovations, like hazards, are not appraised in a purely analytical manner. Rather, the 
appraisals of these innovations may be driven by general affect towards the product as 
suggested by the affect heuristic. The use of this heuristic is conceived as irrational, as 
presented by Finnucane et al. (2000), because the benefits gained from adopting an 
innovation are received independent from the risks of using an innovation. For example, 
the expected benefits from adopting an iPod (e.g., the ability to listen to music on the go) 
are distinct from the associated risks (e.g., the possibility the device may be difficult to 
operate). In most instances, the benefits associated with adopting an innovation (the 
services delivered) are likely to be related positively, though distinct from, the risks (the 
cost of the services) of the product. As Finucane et al. (2000, 3) suggests:  
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“Whereas activities that bring great benefits may be high or low in risk, activities 
that are low in benefit are unlikely to be high in risk (if they were, they would be 
proscribed), suggesting the positive correlation...” 
Evidence of a negative correlation between assessments of risk and benefit among 
product innovations would support the idea that affect may be driving both assessments 
because this relationship is likely to be positive (or non-existent) if assessed objectively. 
However, additional evidence for the use of affect in the appraisals of innovations would 
be suggested if a negative relationship between judgments of risk and benefit was found 
to strengthen in the presence of an affectively extreme evaluation. Finucane et al. (2000) 
left untested the idea that, at an individual level, positive feelings toward a hazard will 
correspond with higher ratings of benefit and lower ratings of risk compared to more 
neutral feelings. Assuming this relationship extends to appraisals of innovations, it would 
follow that an increasingly intense affective response toward an innovation (good/bad) 
would produce greater negative correlations between risk and benefit assessments. 
Accordingly, this relationship would be attenuated in the presence of neutral affective 
responses. In other words, increasingly strong appraisals (e.g., I love it!) should 
correspond with more polarized assessments of risk and benefit (e.g., benefit is very high, 
risk is very low). The related hypothesis is: 
H2:  Judgments of risk and benefit will be influenced by the extremity of 
affective response, such that differences between perceived risks and 
benefits will be greater with increases in the absolute magnitude (both 
positive and negative) of the affective response. 
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Combined, these hypotheses suggest a model under which judgments of risk and benefit 
are influenced by an affective response to the innovation.  The subsequent model 
presented below (see figure 1) suggests that affective evaluations serve as an antecedent 
to judgments of risk and benefit associated with an innovation. This biasing effect on 
judgment occurs when a target elicits an affective response of sufficient magnitude. 
However, a consumer’s affective response may not always exert a dominant influence on 
judgment. For some decisions, affect toward the target may be neutral, whereas in others 
(discussed below) it may simply be ignored. 
 
FIGURE 1 
THE AFFECT HEURISTIC IS USED AS A BASIS OF RISK/BENEFIT JUDGMENTS 
FROM FINUCANE ET AL. (2000)  
 
 
 
Situational Influences. A partial explanation of the circumstances favoring 
affective evaluations has already been outlined. The second hypothesis proposes that 
stronger initial affective responses increase the strength of the negative relationship 
between risk and benefit. A situational variable that has the potential to attenuate the 
influence of affect in judgments is the hedonic versus utilitarian nature of the innovation. 
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There is some evidence that affective reactions to a product’s attributes are more likely to 
influence judgments if the product is perceived as highly hedonic (Yeung and Wyer Jr 
2004). Products that are more hedonic are characterized as being more pleasing and more 
experiential whereas, more utilitarian products are characterized by greater instrumental 
value (Batra and Ahtola 1991; Hirschman and Holbrook 1982; Voss, Spangenberg, and 
Grohmann 2003). Affective criteria are thought to be more appropriate and instrumental 
for judgments of hedonic products, whereas reason based assessments are more 
consistent with utilitarian product judgments. This contention was supported by a series 
of studies which indicated that subjects using hedonic evaluative criteria were more likely 
to rely on affective evaluations than subjects evaluating products using utilitarian criteria 
(Yeung and Wyer Jr 2004). Other research supports this general notion. For example, 
there is evidence that consumers’ reliance on feelings can be moderated by the motives 
that drive their decision (Pham 1998). Overall, consumers appear capable of switching 
between feeling or analytical based judgment processes depending upon the type of 
judgment required. The two related hypotheses are shown below. They are presented 
separately because hedonic and utilitarian aspects of products are best measured 
independently rather than by using bi-polar scales (Voss et al. 2003):  
H3a:  Evaluations of highly hedonic product innovations versus less hedonic 
product innovations will be more influenced by affective responses 
H3b: Evaluations of highly utilitarian product innovations versus less 
utilitarian product innovations will be less influenced by affective 
responses  
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The role of affect in consumer evaluations of new products is investigated in the 
four studies described below. Each of these studies examines the relationship between 
affective evaluations of product innovations and consumer judgments of risk and benefit. 
Studies 1 and 2 test the first hypothesis using different approaches. The first study looks 
for evidence of an inverse relationship between assessments of risk and benefit, while the 
second manipulates information about either the risks or benefits associated with an 
innovation, then tests for changes in perceptions of the non-manipulated attribute. Study 
3 is designed to test the second hypothesis and manipulates the favorability of different 
innovations, then tests for greater differences in perceptions of risk and benefit. Finally, 
study 4 addresses the third hypotheses and tests if the hedonic versus utilitarian nature of 
products leads consumers to vary how heavily they rely upon affective decision making 
processes. 
 
STUDY 1: COGNITIVE LOAD MODERATES THE USE OF THE AFFECT 
HEURISTIC 
 
Study 1 extends a paradigm put forth in Finucane et al. (2000) study 1.  In that 
study, participants were assigned to either a time pressure or a control condition and 
asked to evaluate a variety of social hazards. As expected, participants in the time 
pressure condition perceived a greater negative correlation between risks and benefits of 
various social hazards than participants in a control condition. This increasingly strong 
inverse relationship provided evidence that the negative relationship between risk and 
benefit is driven by an affect-based heuristic rather than purely analytical processes. The 
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current study seeks to extend these findings by employing different manipulations and 
changing the context from social hazards to novel product innovations. 
The first study includes three decision conditions intended to either (1) favor 
heuristic decision making styles, (2) allow participants the freedom to select how to form 
evaluations (control) or (3) encourage participants to form analytical evaluations. 
Previous research has suggested that when individuals are forced to make decisions with 
fewer cognitive resources available, they tend to favor heuristic decision making 
strategies (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988) because they are more efficient.  
Therefore, this study includes a working memory load condition that is intended to 
constrain cognitive resources and bias participants towards relying on affect as a heuristic 
when forming their evaluations. A second condition serves as a control and participants 
are not given any instructions and allowed the opportunity to choose how they form their 
evaluations. Finally, in a third condition, participants are instructed to evaluate each 
innovation by listing and assigning weights to the risks and benefits associated with each 
product before judging the product’s favorability in an effort to encourage analytical 
evaluations. Risk and benefit judgments among those participants assigned to a working 
memory load condition are expected to have a stronger inverse relationship than those of 
participants in the control condition. Such a finding would suggest an increased reliance 
on affect when judging the product attributes. Conversely, judgments of risk and benefit 
are expected to be weakly related (if at all) among participants in the analytical decision 
making condition as compared to the control condition or the working memory condition.  
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Method 
 
One-hundred-and-fifty participants were recruited from a large northwestern 
university. The study was a 3 (decision condition: WM load, control, analytical) x 16 
(innovation type: innovation 1-16) design with the first factor between-subjects and the 
second partially within-subjects. Participants were assigned to one of the three decision 
conditions and each participant evaluated a random selection of six (out of 16 possible) 
products.  
 
Stimuli. Sixteen product innovations were selected for this study according to 
several criteria. First, innovations were identified that represent functionally original 
ideas rather than aesthetic variations of existing products. Secondly, because target 
innovations were presented on a computer screen, only those that were relatively easy to 
understand were selected. Finally, concepts were selected that would (1) elicit a range of 
affective responses and (2) be relevant to the sample of college age students. A list of the 
16 product innovations that was included in this research is shown in appendix A. 
 
Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions. In the working 
memory condition, participants were placed under a working memory load immediately 
before evaluating each product innovation. This was accomplished by asking participants 
to remember a nine-digit number (e.g., “Please remember the following number. Do not 
write anything down, try to remember the number in your head: 762714112”) while they 
evaluated each product (for an example see: Shiv and Huber 2000). Participants in the 
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control condition were not asked to remember a number and were simply asked to 
evaluate each product. Finally, participants in the analytical condition were asked to 
produce a list of the risks and benefits associated with each innovation and then rank each 
before making summary judgments of the product’s risks and benefits (order 
counterbalanced). 
After being presented with a picture and description of each product, participants 
(depending on their condition) were asked to “choose a point on the scale that best 
matches your opinion of the innovation you just saw.” Risk evaluations for each product 
were collected on an 11-point scale anchored by “Very Risky” and “Not at All Risky”. 
Evaluations of benefits were also measured on an 11-point scale anchored by “Very 
Beneficial” and “Not at All Beneficial.” In addition, participant’s affective evaluation of 
the product was measured with three items (I like it/I dislike it, Good/Bad, 
Favorable/Unfavorable), again on an 11-point scale. The scale items were presented in a 
random order to avoid any ordering effects. Participants in the working memory load 
condition were asked to recall the nine-digit number after evaluating each product. 
After evaluating all six innovations, participants in the working memory load 
condition were asked to estimate how accurate they were in remembering the numbers, 
how hard they tried to remember the numbers and if they used any tools to help them 
remember the numbers. Similarly, participants in the analytical condition were asked how 
closely they followed the procedure. Participants assigned to the control condition did not 
receive any further instructions. 
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Results 
 
Correlations between risk and benefit by innovation for each condition are shown 
in table 1.  In the analytical condition, the correlation between risk and benefit rating 
across innovations was -.22. A negative relationship was found between risk and benefit 
in 11 of the 16 innovations. Of these, only three were significant (α < .05). Differences 
between risk/benefit correlations between conditions were calculated using a Fisher r to z 
transformation. In the control condition, the correlation between risk and benefit across 
innovations was significantly more negative than in the analytical condition (rcontrol = -
.42, z = -3.24, p < .01). At a product level, negative relationships between judgments of 
risk and benefit were observed for all of the 16 innovations, 10 of which reached the 
conventional level of significance. The negative correlation between risk and benefit was 
found to be significantly less (more negative) for four products in the control group 
compared to the correlation between risk and benefit in the analytical condition. In the 
working memory load condition, the correlation between risk and benefit rating across 
innovations was -.43, which was not significantly different than the measured risk/benefit 
correlation in the control condition (z = -.29, n.s.). Within the working memory load 
condition, a negative relationship between judgments of risk and benefit was again 
observed among all 16 products. Of these, the risk/benefit correlations of nine products 
reached a level of significance. Significant differences among the risk/benefit correlations 
between the control condition and the working memory condition were found for five of 
the 16 innovations. Of these, four were in the direction expected (WM load < control 
condition) and one was opposite what was hypothesized (WM load > control condition).  
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Discussion 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that consumers would judge the risks and benefits of an 
innovation to be negatively related.  The results of study 1 provided evidence to support 
this hypothesis. Study participants reported an inverse relationship between their 
perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with a variety of product innovations. 
Surprisingly, the working memory load condition did not consistently strengthen the 
negative relationship between judgments of risk and benefit beyond that of the control 
condition. However, participants in the analytical condition did indicate a marked 
decrease in their perceptions of the relationship between these two attributes as compared 
to participants in the control condition and the working memory load condition.  
Participants in the analytical condition were asked to form their evaluations of 
risk and benefit using a analytical process in which they first considered the risks and 
benefits associated with an innovation before they formed an overall evaluation. This 
manipulation significantly attenuated the relationship between perceptions of risk and 
benefit. However, when consumers were allowed to freely form these evaluations 
(control condition), the relationship between risk and benefit was shown to be stronger, 
producing a similar pattern of judgments to those who were placed under a cognitive 
load. Previous research has used time pressure to increase a participant’s reliance on 
heuristic decision making styles. It is possible that time pressure manipulations may be 
stronger than the working memory load manipulation used in study 1. Alternatively, it is  
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TABLE 1 
 
Correlations Between Risk and Benefit by Innovation and Condition: Study 1 
 
 
Working Memory Load 
  
Control Condition 
  
Analytical Condition 
Innovation r   sig n z   r   sig n z   r   sig n 
Vaccine Strips -0.20 
 
0.21 42  0.92  -0.39  
0.02  38  0.86 
 
-0.57 < 0.01  25 
Uno Bike -0.52 < 0.01 37 -1.52 * -0.21 
 
0.19  40  0.92 
 
-0.45 
 
0.04  21 
Solar Phone -0.34 
 
0.04 37  0.38  -0.42  
0.02  29 -0.06 
 
-0.40 
 
0.10  18 
Tricycle -0.41 
 
0.01 36  0.28  -0.47  
0.01  34 -1.89 **  0.07 
 
0.76  19 
Power Mat -0.23 
 
0.13 44 -0.55  -0.10  
0.58  32 -0.45 
 
 0.03 
 
0.90  24 
Fruit Bowl -0.59 < 0.01 42 -1.64 ** -0.27 
 
0.13  34 -0.98 
 
 0.10 
 
0.77  12 
Refrigerator -0.47 
 
0.01 33  0.46  -0.56 <  0.01  34 -2.74 **  0.21  
0.39  19 
Dog Bowl -0.20 
 
0.25 34  0.09  -0.22  
0.17  40 -0.00 
 
-0.22 
 
0.35  20 
Cord Lock Light -0.64 < 0.01 28 -2.52 ** -0.09 
 
0.60  38  0.43 
 
-0.21 
 
0.34  23 
Bottle Cooler -0.49 < 0.01 39 -0.44  -0.40  
0.02  35 -0.58 
 
-0.25 
 
0.28  21 
Composting Disposal -0.53 < 0.01 33  0.15  -0.56 <  0.01  30 -0.79  
-0.38 
 
0.08  23 
Water Meter -0.25 
 
0.14 35 -0.01  -0.25  
0.14  37  0.13 
 
-0.28 
 
0.17  25 
Solar Blinds -0.31 
 
0.07 37  0.68  -0.45  
0.01  31 -2.69 **  0.28 
 
0.19  24 
Bike Light -0.70 < 0.01 45 -2.09 ** -0.37 
 
0.03  35  0.39 
 
-0.45 
 
0.02  26 
GPS -0.32 
 
0.25 36  2.17 ** -0.71 <  0.01  30 -3.01 ** -0.03 
 
0.89  25 
Light Converter -0.20 
 
0.25 34  1.21 
 
-0.46 <  0.01  40 -0.30 
 
-0.39 
 
0.13  17 
                 Overall -0.43 < 0.01 592 -0.29  -0.42 <  0.01  557 -3.24 ** -0.22 < 0.01  342 
*one tailed p < 0.10 
               **one tailed p < 0.05 
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possible that the lack of difference between the control and cognitive load conditions 
could be due to a ceiling effect. 
However, this pattern of results instead may suggest that the default process used 
by consumers to form evaluations of product attributes is more similar to that used when 
cognitive resources are constrained (WM load condition) than to a more analytical 
process of forming evaluations. These results fit well with an affective decision making 
explanation over that of a purely analytical process.  
Study 2 further examines the relationship between judgments of risk and benefit 
and provides a second test of hypothesis 1. In the first study, processing style was 
manipulated  and risk and benefit perceptions were measured. The second study 
manipulates these two attributes to see if changes to one influence judgments of the other.  
Specifically, in the second study participants are asked to evaluate a series of innovations 
twice. After the first evaluation, participants are given information about either the risks 
or benefits associated with each innovation. Changes in their evaluation are recorded 
between the two measurement occasions. The study is designed to test if the provision of 
information alters consumer judgments of the non-manipulated attribute in an affectively 
congruent manner. Such changes indicate that judgments of risk or benefit are not 
considered independently, but rather based on overall affective evaluations of the 
innovation. 
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STUDY 2: MANIPULATIONS OF PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES PRODUCE 
AFFECTIVELY CONGRUENT CHANGES IN THE NON-MANIPULATED 
ATTRIBUTE 
 
An analytical model of innovation adoption decisions would predict that 
information about the risks associated with innovations is assessed independently from 
information about the product benefits. For example, an analytical model would predict 
that providing information that minimized the perceived benefits of an innovation should 
not necessarily confer any relevant information about the product’s risks. Because no 
new information is provided about the risks of the product, risk evaluations would be 
expected to remain unchanged. However, the affect heuristic would predict just the 
opposite. Information downplaying the benefits of a product would reduce the 
favorability of that product and could be expected to increase perceptions of risk, even 
without directly providing any risk information. The affect heuristic is based on the idea 
that people consult their affective evaluation of a stimulus when making specific 
judgments about the attributes of an object. If this is the case, then manipulations that 
increase the favorability of an innovation, such as information that serves to increase the 
perceived benefits or reduce the perceived risks of an innovation, should produce an 
affectively congruent shift in the non-manipulated attribute. For example, according to 
the affect heuristic, providing information that reduces the risk of adopting an innovation 
should increase the favorability of that innovation. This more favorable evaluation should 
subsequently increase judgments of the innovation’s benefits. Alternatively, if the 
information provided serves to increase the perceived riskiness of adopting an innovation, 
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a consumer’s affective evaluation of the product is expected to become less favorable.  
When consulted, this less favorable evaluation of the innovation would be expected to 
lead to a diminished evaluation of the product’s benefits. 
The same pattern could be expected if the consumer was provided information 
about the benefits of a product. Increasing the perceived benefits of a product should 
increase the favorability of the innovation, and subsequently, should decrease the 
perceived risks of that innovation. Whereas, information that reduces the perceived 
benefits of an innovation should decrease the favorability of an innovation and lead to 
increased risk evaluations.  
The results of the first study demonstrate that participants both in the control 
condition and those who had limited cognitive resources (the WM load condition) 
evaluated the risks and benefits associated with innovations as having a stronger inverse 
relationship than those who were asked to make more analytical decisions. The second 
study is intended to strengthen these findings by experimentally manipulating 
information about the risks and benefits associated with an innovation then recording 
changes in the non-manipulated attribute. If manipulations to one attribute produce 
inverse changes to another, unrelated attribute, then a case can be made for a common 
affective evaluation connecting the two evaluations. 
The second study follows a paradigm outlined by Finucane et al. (2000). Risk 
information is presented separately from information about an innovation’s benefits. 
Information about either are expected to produce changes to judgments of the other due 
to their relationship with the more general affective evaluation that is consulted as 
participants construct their judgments. 
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Method 
 
One-hundred-and-fifty students from a large public northwestern university were 
recruited to participate in this study. The structure of the experiment followed that of the 
second study conducted by Finucane et al. (2000). Specifically, the study used a 4 
(information: high-risk, low-risk, high-benefit, low-benefit) by 3 (innovation: Power Mat, 
Vaccine Strips, Simple GPS) pretest-posttest design with the first factor between subjects 
and the second factor within subjects. Several unrelated studies served as filler tasks 
separating the pre- and post-test measures. 
 
Procedure. During the initial presentation, each participant was presented with a 
picture and a brief description of each innovation (see descriptions from appendix A) in a 
randomized order. After viewing each innovation, participants completed the set of 
measures that were used in study 1. Participants then completed approximately 30 
minutes of filler tasks. After completing the filler tasks, participants received the 
following instructions: “The subsequent page contains some general information about 
the risks (benefits) associated with each of several innovations. Even though it is 
recognized that there are also some benefits (risks) associated with these products, these 
will not be dealt with at this time.” Following the instructions, subjects were presented 
with a picture and description of each innovation for a second time (in a randomized 
order) along with additional information intended to influence their evaluations of either 
risks or benefits, depending upon the condition to which they were assigned (see 
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appendix B for each condition). After being presented with information about the risks or 
benefits of each innovation, participants evaluated each a second time using the same 
measures.  
 
Results 
 
Following Finucane et al. (2000), separate mean values were calculated for risk 
and benefit ratings across participants for each innovation. From these values, a mean 
difference measure was calculated which was then divided by the standard error of the 
mean difference measure to produce a t-value for both the manipulated and non-
manipulated attributes. Figure 2 provides a plot of these values.  
The plotted t-values (see figure 2) demonstrate a clear negative relationship 
between changes in the manipulated and non-manipulated attributes. The overall 
correlation of the 12 points plotted in figure 2 was -.87. Overall, the results were as 
expected; demonstrating that perceptions of risk and benefit are not judged 
independently. Of the 12 sets (three innovations x four conditions) of t-values, 10 
evidenced changes in both the manipulated and non-manipulated variables in the 
directions expected.  That is, manipulations to either risk or benefit produced affectively 
congruent changes to the non-manipulated attribute. Within the two sets of t-values that 
did not change in the direction expected (Power Matt/high-benefit and Vaccine 
Strips/low-benefit), the manipulated attribute (benefit for both) was not found to have 
changed significantly (t(36) = .98, n.s. and t(39) = -.55, n.s. respectively) between the two 
measurement occasions. That is, manipulations intended to alter perceptions of benefits  
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FIGURE 2 
T-VALUES FOR MANIPULATED VS. NON-MANIPULATED ATTRIBUTES: 
STUDY 2  
 
did not produce changes as expected. However, the non-manipulated attribute (risk) in 
both of these conditions did change significantly (t(36) = 2.24, p = .03 and t(39) = 4.60, p 
< .01 respectively), in a direction that was opposite that which was anticipated, but which 
was affectively congruent with the directional changes observed in the manipulated 
attribute. This again is evidence that participants consulted their affective evaluation of 
the innovations when determining their judgments of the risks and benefits associated 
with them rather than forming judgments of risk and benefit independently. Overall, the 
t-values for the manipulated and non-manipulated attributes provided support for the 
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affect heuristic. Changes in the non-manipulated attribute were all in an affectively 
congruent direction. 
A second method of analyzing the data from study 2 is to examine individual 
participant reactions to the manipulations. Tables 2 and 3 summarize these reactions. The 
bottom row of table 2 shows that the manipulation worked in 59.1% of trials (e.g., a  
participant who received information intended to increase perceptions of risk indicated 
higher perceived risk at time 2 than at time 1), produced no change in 14.2% of the trials 
and changed opposite what was expected in 26.7% of trials. The high-risk manipulations 
were among the most successful with the manipulation acting to increase risk in 75.2% of 
trials. In contrast, the high-benefit conditions were the least successful, producing a 
decrease in benefit judgments in 42.7% of trials. The success rates of the manipulations 
were similar across each of the three innovations. 
 
TABLE 2 
Effect of Information on Manipulated Attribute: Study 2  
Condition 
Percent of 
trials that 
manipulation 
worked 
Percent of trials 
that the effect was 
opposite 
manipulation 
Percent of 
trails with 
no change 
High Risk 75.24 17.14 _7.62 
Low Risk 56.57 21.21 22.22 
High Benefit 42.74 37.61 19.66 
Low Benefit 62.79 28.68 _8.53 
	      
Power Mat 62.00 26.67 11.33 
Vaccine Strips 54.67 29.33 16.00 
GPS 60.67 15.33 24.00 
    
Overall (n = 450) 59.11 14.22 26.67 
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TABLE 3 
Effect of Information on Non-Manipulated Attributes: Study 2 
 Effect on the non-manipulated attribute 
Effect on the manipulated 
attribute 
Percent of 
trials 
prediction 
confirmed 
Percent of trials 
change was 
opposite of 
prediction 
Percent of 
trials no 
change 
Manipulation Worked (n = 
266; 59.1%) 62.41 16.92 20.68 
No Change (n = 64, 14.2%) 39.06 29.69 31.25 
Change was contrary to 
manipulation (n = 120; 
26.7%) 
30.83 51.67 17.50 
Total (n = 450) 50.67 28.00 21.33 
 
The effects of risk and benefit information on the non-manipulated attributes are 
shown in table 3.  In the 59.1% of instances in which the manipulation worked as 
expected (from table 2), the non-manipulated attribute changed in an affectively 
congruent direction 62.4% of the time. Thus, in the majority of cases in which the 
manipulation worked as intended (e.g., information intended to increase perceptions of 
risk actually led to increases in risk perceptions) the non-manipulated attribute (e.g., 
benefit) changed in a direction opposite that of the manipulated attribute (e.g., 
perceptions of benefits decreased). An additional 20.7% of these cases produced no 
change in the non-manipulated attribute, and in 16.9% of cases, participants indicated 
that the non-manipulated attribute changed in the same direction as the manipulated 
attribute (opposite of what was predicted). This finding confirms those of Finucane et al. 
(2000), demonstrating that when the manipulation worked as expected (e.g., high-risk 
information increases perceived risks), the non-manipulated attribute generally moved in 
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the opposite direction (e.g., high-risk information decreases perceived benefit), as 
predicted by the affect heuristic. These findings support the idea that consumers do not 
fully partition information about one attribute (e.g., risks) when making judgments about 
another (e.g., benefits), even when no logical basis exists for making inferences about 
one from the other. 
 When the presentation of information failed to produce an effect on the 
manipulated attribute (no change, row 2 of table 3), the non-manipulated attribute 
changed as expected in 39.1% of trials and in a direction opposite to what was expected 
in 29.7% of trials. Another 31.3% of trials produced no change in the non-manipulated 
attribute. Such a pattern is not surprising, because the absence of a perceived change in 
the manipulated attribute would not be expected to change a participant’s affective 
evaluation of the innovation. Subsequently, the non-manipulated attribute was not 
expected to change more frequently in one direction than another. 
Finally, in those instances in which the manipulated attribute changed in a 
direction that was contrary to the manipulation (e.g., judgments of risk decreased in 
response to information intended to increase perceptions of risk), the non-manipulated 
attribute was found to have changed in the predicted direction only 30.8% of the time 
(judgments of benefits decreased in the example above). Comparing this value to that of 
the cell in the first column and first row of table 3 (62.4%), it is apparent that the values 
are starkly different. Overall, the non-manipulated attribute was more likely to move in a 
manner inverse to changes in the manipulated attribute even in those instances in which 
the manipulation did not function as expected. In 51.7% of trials when the manipulation 
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produced contrary results, the non-manipulated attribute moved inversely (but affectively 
congruently) to the manipulated attribute (see row 3, column 2 in table 3).   
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, the results of study 2 provided additional support for the first hypothesis 
and further demonstrated the use of affect in consumer evaluations of innovations. 
Participants perceived changes in the non-manipulated attribute, despite not receiving any 
information about that attribute. Most changes in the non-manipulated attribute were 
found to occur in a direction affectively congruent with changes in the manipulated 
attribute. This pattern was found even among instances in which the manipulation did not 
work as expected. The results were different from what would have been expected if 
consumer judgments were derived only from analytical reasoning.  
The t-values plotted in figure 2 demonstrated the strong inverse relationship 
between risk and benefit across conditions and innovations. At the individual level, the 
inverse risk/benefit relationship was more apparent. Successful manipulations of either 
risks or benefits produced inverse changes in the non-manipulated attribute. When 
manipulations produced changes that were opposite of what was intended, this inverse 
relationship still held. The values reported in table 3 align closely, and are often more 
convincing, than those reported by Finucane et al. (2000) in their study of hazards. For 
example, in the present study the manipulations worked in a greater number of instances 
(59% versus 50%). Further, the non-manipulated attribute changed in an affectively 
congruent direction in a greater number of instances in the current study (62% versus 
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45% among instances in which the manipulation worked as expected and 52% versus 
33% among those instances in which the manipulation produced an opposite change than 
expected). 
The findings from study 2 are important because they demonstrated a causal, 
inverse relationship between judgments of an innovation’s risks and benefits that was 
congruent with an affective decision process. When making evaluations about the non-
manipulated attribute, participants appear to have turned to a common affective 
evaluation rather than analytically assessing information at hand. Study 3 seeks to further 
demonstrate this relationship by manipulating favorability rather than risk or benefit.  
 
STUDY 3: AFFECTIVELY EXTREME EVALUATIONS INCREASE PERCEIVED 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JUDGMENTS OF RISK AND BENEFIT 
 
The results of study 2 demonstrated that when provided with risk or benefit 
information, consumers form affectively congruent inferences about other attributes 
which are not logically connected with the information received. This finding is 
inconsistent with what would be expected if consumers developed their judgments of 
these innovations using analytical processes alone because information about one 
attribute (e.g., benefit) should be logically uninformative when making judgments of 
other attributes (e.g., risks). The second study however, manipulated favorability 
indirectly (through either risk or benefit information). The third study uses another 
manipulation intended to increase or decrease the affective evaluations of a product 
compared to a control group. Before participants began the third study, they were 
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instructed that the majority of students from another data collection liked (disliked) each 
of the innovations they were about to see. Past research has shown that consumer 
preferences can be influenced by providing information about how others evaluate a 
target (Burnkrant and Cousineau 1975; Morwitz and Pluzinski 1996).  Thus, participants 
who were instructed that previous participants liked the innovations were expected to 
increase their overall evaluations of each of the innovations in the study relative to a 
control group who did not receive any information. Whereas, those participants who 
received information indicating that other study participants disliked the innovations were 
expected to report less favorable evaluations of the innovations relative to the control 
group. This manipulation was designed in such a way that participants were not provided 
with any information about the risks and benefits associated with the products. 
Participants were only told that earlier (equally naïve) participants from another study 
either liked or disliked the products they were shown. This information is expected to 
influence study participant’s affective evaluations of the products and correspondingly 
produce affectively congruent changes in judgments of both risk and benefit.  By 
manipulating affective evaluations, this study is designed to test hypothesis 2, which 
predicts that the extremity of a participant’s affective evaluation will be positively related 
to differences between judgments of risk and benefit. It is hypothesized that more 
affectively extreme reactions (e.g., I like it/I dislike it) will correspond to greater 
differences between risk and benefit compared to affectively neutral responses (e.g., 
neither like nor dislike).  
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Method 
 
Forty-two students from a large, public northwestern university were recruited to 
participate in this study. The study was a 3 (instructions: favorable, control, unfavorable) 
by 3 (innovation: Tricycle, Dog Bowl and Fruit Bowl) design with the first factor 
between subjects and the second factor within subjects.  Participants were assigned one of 
the three instruction conditions and each participant evaluated the same three innovations 
presented in random order.  
 
Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of three instruction conditions. In 
the favorable instructions condition, participants were told: “In this study we are 
interested in your opinions of new products and concepts. On the following screens you 
will be presented with 3 different new products that were favorably evaluated in a 
previous study similar to this one. In that study, the majority of participants indicated that 
they liked each of these products. Please answer the questions to the best of your ability.” 
Those participants assigned to the unfavorable instruction condition received the same 
instructions, but the wording was changed to indicate that students from a previous study 
disliked each of the products. Participants in the control condition were not given any 
information about other participants who may have evaluated the products and were 
simply told that they would be presented with three products and asked to give their 
opinion of each. 
 After reading the instructions, participants were randomly presented with three 
products selected from the first study (Tricycle, Dog Bowl and Fruit Bowl) and asked to 
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complete the same measures used in study 1 for each. Scale items measuring affective 
evaluations of the innovations were combined to form a single variable for each product 
(αTricycle = .94, αDog Bowl = .95, αFruit Bowl = .92).  
 
Results 
 
The different instruction conditions were expected to produce differences in 
affective evaluations of the innovations. To test this manipulation, the within subjects 
evaluations of each innovation were combined to form a single affective score for each 
instructional condition. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the 
averaged evaluation as a dependent variable, and the instructional conditions as the 
independent variable. A significant main effect of instruction conditions on affective 
evaluation was found (F(2,39) = 4.31, p = .02). Planned contrasts revealed that the 
affective evaluations of participants assigned to the control group (Mcontrol = 8.06) and 
those assigned to the favorable instruction group (Mfavorable = 8.30) differed from those 
assigned to the unfavorable instruction group (Munfavorable = 6.74; t(39) = 2.90, p = .01). 
No statistical difference in affective evaluations was observed between those assigned to 
the favorable condition and those in the control condition (t(39) =.46, n.s.). Interestingly, 
the mean evaluation for participants who were told that previous study participants 
disliked the innovations, was near the midpoint of the scale (six on an 11-point scale). 
Thus, the average affective evaluation of those who were provided negative information 
is best characterized as neutral rather than negative, whereas those in the other two 
conditions held favorable evaluations. This analysis was also conducted using a repeated 
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measures ANOVA. The results of that analysis indicated within subjects differences in 
affective evaluations of the innovations (the Tricycle was preferred over the other two 
innovations), but no interaction between the different innovations and instructional 
conditions. 
 Hypothesis 2 states that more extreme affective responses are expected to 
correspond to a stronger negative relationship between risks and benefits. To test this 
hypothesis a measure of the difference between risk and benefit for each innovation was 
calculated then averaged across products. Greater differences between risk and benefit 
are expected to correspond with more affectively extreme evaluations.  An ANOVA was 
conducted with the difference measure as the dependent variable and the instruction 
conditions as the independent measure. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
instructions on the dependent variable (F(2,39) = 12.95, p < .01). Planned contrasts 
revealed that the risk/benefit difference scores for those participants who were told that 
previous study participants liked the innovations (Mfavorable = -4.38) and those assigned to 
the control condition (Mcontrol = -4.04) were significantly different from participants who 
were instructed that previous study participants did not like the innovations (Munfavorable = 
.67, t(39) = 5.08, p < .01). However, difference scores of the group of participants who 
were told that previous study participants liked the innovations was not found to differ 
from those assigned to the control group (t(39) = .33, n.s.). These results reflect the 
observed differences in participant’s affective evaluation of these innovations, and 
support hypothesis 2.  Those conditions that produced stronger affective responses 
(favorable information and control conditions) also produced greater differences in 
judgments of risk and benefit. Conversely, when participants were provided with 
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unfavorable information, their affective evaluation of the innovations was neutral and the 
perceived difference between risk and benefit was attenuated.  
 
Discussion 
 
Study 3 provided support for hypothesis 2. More affectively extreme evaluations 
were shown to correspond with greater differences in risk and benefit judgments, 
suggesting that participants were basing these judgments on their underlying affective 
evaluations of the products.  The instructions provided to participants acted to increase or 
decrease favorability judgments, but were devoid of information that could logically 
inform judgments of the risks and benefits associated with the product. While the 
manipulations were effective, it was surprising that participants who were provided with 
negative information indicated only neutral, rather than negative, evaluations of the 
innovations. As expected from such an affectively weak evaluation, these same 
participants perceived nearly equivalent amounts of risk and benefit associated with the 
products, evidenced by a low mean difference score. In contrast, those participants 
assigned to the control condition and those who were provided with positive information 
gave similarly favorable evaluations to the innovations they evaluated. As predicted by 
hypothesis 2, greater differences in judgments of risk and benefit were found among 
participants in these groups as compared to the group that was provided negative 
information.  
 The relationship between affective extremity and the difference between 
judgments of risk and benefit is explored further in the final study. The purpose of study 
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4 is to test for product level attributes that may moderate consumers’ use of the affect 
heuristic when making judgments.  
 
STUDY 4: PRODUCT LEVEL MODERATORS OF THE AFFECT HEURISTIC 
 
The results of the first two studies supported the first hypothesis by demonstrating 
that the inverse relationship between risk and benefit found among judgments of social 
hazards and financial products also applies to consumer judgments of novel product 
innovations. The third study demonstrated support for the second hypothesis, establishing 
the relationship between more affectively extreme evaluations and greater perceived 
differences in risk and benefit.  Combined, these first three studies provide empirical 
support for the use of the affect heuristic in consumer evaluations of innovations. The 
fourth study is expected to support these findings and provide a test of hypothesis 3. In 
this study, participants are asked to evaluate the 16 product innovations from the first 
study, across a number of dimensions. The goal of this study is to test if product level 
attributes might moderate the affect heuristic as measured by the relationship between 
affective extremity and the difference between judgments of risk and benefit. 
Specifically, it is expected that consumers may rely more heavily upon the affect 
heuristic when evaluating more hedonic products than when evaluating more utilitarian 
products (hypothesis 3a and 3b).  
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Method 
 
One-hundred-twenty-four students were recruited from a large northwestern 
university. Participants evaluated six products presented in a random order, which were 
randomly selected from a pool of 16 innovations used in study 1 (see appendix A). 
 
Procedure. Initial instructions informed participants that they would be asked to 
provide their opinions of several products and concepts. Upon reading the instructions 
participants were presented with each product individually, followed by a set of measures 
described below.  
 
Measures. After viewing the description of each product, subjects were presented 
with the first block of questions used in the other three experiments. Next, participants 
completed multi-item scales to measure four different product concepts: (1) product 
radicalness, (2) hedonic dimensions, (3) utilitarian dimensions and (4) aesthetic appeal.  
In total, this question block contained 20 items which were randomized for each of the 
six products that were presented to each participant. The radicalness scale (αradicalness = 
.88) consisted of seven, nine-point bi-polar items and was adapted from radicalness scales 
developed by Gatignon et al. (2002) and Oliver et al. (1993). The measure of hedonic and 
utilitarian product dimensions (αhedonic = .93, αutilitarian = .92) was composed of ten (five 
hedonic, five utilitarian), nine-point bipolar items developed by Voss et al. (2003). 
Finally three, nine-point bipolar items were used to measure the aesthetic appeal (αaesthetic 
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appeal = .89) of each innovation. These items are adapted from Hirschman’s (1986) product 
aesthetics scale. 
 The final block of questions consisted of two items. On a nine-point bipolar scale, 
participants were asked to rate how knowledgeable they were about the type of product 
they were shown (category knowledge) as well as how well they understood the product 
concept.  
 
Results  
 
Hypothesis 3a suggested that evaluations of highly hedonic, relative to less 
hedonic, product innovations would be influenced more by affective responses than less 
hedonic innovations. Similarly, hypothesis 3b proposed that evaluations of highly 
utilitarian product innovations would be less influenced by affective responses than 
would evaluations of less utilitarian product innovations. To test these hypotheses, the 16 
product innovations were divided into quartiles based on their mean hedonic and 
utilitarian scores. Two mixed design multiple regressions, one evaluating high versus low 
utilitarian innovations and one evaluating high versus low hedonic innovations, were 
conducted using dummy codes to differentiate among the innovations that were rated in 
the upper and lower quartiles on the hedonic or utilitarian scale. The dependent variable 
in each of these regression models was the absolute difference between risk and benefit 
judgments for each product. This absolute difference score was regressed onto the 
extremity of the participant’s affective evaluation of each innovation. The affective 
extremity variable was calculated by centering the absolute value of the affective 
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evaluation provided for each product. Thus, each participant’s affective rating of the 
product (e.g., neutral to strong affect) served as the predictor for the absolute difference 
between judgments of risk and benefit. An interaction term was also calculated by taking 
the product of the dummy code and the affective extremity measure. The regression to 
test hypothesis 3a/b was performed in three steps with the affective rating variable 
entered first, followed by the dummy code, and finally, the interaction term. The 
regression of the absolute difference score onto the strength of the affective experience 
was statistically significant for both the utilitarian innovations (F(1,375) = 94.45, p < .01, 
R2 = .21) and the hedonic innovations (F(1,372) = 74.08, p < .01, R2 =. 17).  
The strength of the affective response toward each product was found to be a 
significant predictor of the absolute difference between risk and benefit for both 
utilitarian and hedonic innovations (b = .88, SE = .09, p < .01; b = .76, SE = .09, p < .01 
respectively), providing further support for hypothesis 2. This result indicates that for 
every standard deviation increase in affective extremity, the absolute difference score 
(negative relationship between risk and benefit) increased .45 among utilitarian products, 
and .41 among hedonic products.  
In both sets of regressions, the R2 resulting from the addition of the dummy coded 
term was not significant, indicating that the relationship between absolute affective 
response and the absolute difference score was not statistically different between the two 
groups, and that both groups could be represented by a common intercept and slope. 
Overall, the results do not lend support to hypothesis 3, thus suggesting, that the 
relationship between affective extremity and absolute risk/benefit difference is not  
 
 55 
 
 
TABLE 4 
 
Regression Analysis: Study 4 
 
High Versus Low Utility (R2 = .21, F(1,375) = 94.45, p < .01) 
Variable b SE t Β sr p 
Intercept   .08   .14   .58     .56 
ABS Affect   .88   .09  9.72   .45   .45 < .01 
       
High Versus Low Hedonic (R2 =.17, F(1,372) = 74.08, p < .01) 
Variable b SE t Β sr p 
Intercept - .29   .14 -2.09     .04 
ABS Affect   .76   .09  8.61   .41   .41 < .01 
       
High Versus Low Radicalness (R2 = .25, F(2,366) = 60.39, p < .01) 
R2 change when adding dummies .22 to .25, +.02 F(1,366) = 11.76, p < .01 
Variable b SE t Β sr p 
Intercept   .32   .20  1.63     .1  
ABS Affect   .98   .09 10.99   .52   .50 < .01 
D1 - .96   .28  3.43 - .16 - .16 < .01 
       
High Versus Low Category Knowledge (R2 = .23, F(2,351) = 52.11, p < .01) 
R2 change when adding dummies .21 to .23, +.02 F(1,351) = 7.32, p < .01 
Variable b SE t Β sr p 
Intercept   .71   .19  3.81   < .01 
ABS Affect   .90   .09 10.04   .47   .47 < .01 
D1 - .76   .28 - .27 - .13 - .13    .01 
       
High Versus Low Product Understanding (R2 = .189, F(2,378) = 46.59, p < .01) 
R2 change when adding dummies .189 to .198, +.009 F(1,378) = 4.32, p = .05 
Variable b SE t Β sr p 
Intercept   .39   .18  2.11     .04 
ABS Affect   .85   .09  9.58   .44   .44 < .01 
D1 - .57   .27 - .21 - .10 - .10   .04 
       
High Versus Low Aesthetic Appeal (R2 = .16, F(2,362) = 35.41, p < .01) 
R2 change when adding dummies .15 to .16, +.01 F(1,362) = 4.45, p = .04 
Variable b SE t Β sr p 
Intercept - .04   .20 -  .20     .84 
ABS Affect   .77   .09   8.41   .42   .40 < .01 
D1 - .60   .28 - 2.11 - .11 - .10   .04 
   
 56 
 
 
 
moderated by the hedonic or utilitarian nature of the innovation, at least not for the 
innovations included in this study. 
To test if other product attributes might moderate the relationship between 
affective extremity and absolute risk/benefit differences, the 16 innovations were again 
partitioned into quartiles on the basis of innovation radicalness, category knowledge, 
product understanding, and aesthetic appeal. The results of each of these regression 
analyses are presented in table 4.  Innovation radicalness was found to have a main effect  
on the absolute difference judgments between risk and benefits. That is, the mean 
absolute difference scores between highly radical and less radical product innovations 
were found to differ along the continuum of absolute affective product ratings. For each 
value of the absolute affective response, the absolute difference between risk and benefit 
was lower for more radical innovations (β = -.16) than for less radical products, although 
the differences in the responses did not change across the continuum of answers (i.e., 
there was no interaction). A similar result was found for category knowledge, product 
understanding and aesthetic appeal in which innovations about which consumers had 
greater category knowledge, greater product understanding, or which were more 
aesthetically appealing corresponded to lower (β = -.13, -.10, -.10 respectively) absolute 
differences between risk and benefit responses.  
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Discussion  
 
The results of study 4 provide further evidence that the inverse relationship found 
between judgments of risk and benefit among hazards (Finucane et al. 2000) can also be 
generalized to innovations. Further, the regression analysis demonstrated a consistent 
relationship between the extremity of an affective response and the difference between 
risk and benefit. The results indicated that increasingly extreme affective responses (i.e., 
strong liking/disliking versus neutral evaluation) corresponded with larger differences 
between risk and benefit. 
The 16 innovations in this study were split into quartiles based on several product 
attributes. In the first two analyses, no main or interaction effects were found for either 
utilitarian or hedonic product ratings on the relationship between affect extremity and 
absolute risk/benefit difference. Thus, no support was found for hypothesis 3a or 3b.  
This inability to find significant results may be the result of a failure to include 
innovations which elicited extreme enough hedonic and utilitarian ratings. While the 
upper and lower hedonic quartile groups of innovations had mean hedonic evaluations 
that were significantly different from one another, both groups had average hedonic 
ratings above the midpoint (4.5 on a nine-point scale) on the hedonic rating scale. A 
similar problem was present for innovations split into quartiles on the basis of mean 
utilitarian scale ratings.  
In an effort to find other innovation specific attributes that may moderate the use 
of the affect heuristic, quartile splits were also calculated on the basis of innovation 
radicalness, category knowledge, product understanding, and aesthetic appeal. For each 
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of these variables, only main effects were found indicating that participants relied upon 
the affect heuristic to an equal extent regardless of differences in product level attributes 
or experience with the product category. Therefore, the results of this study did not find 
evidence of product level moderators of the affect heuristic.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Each of the studies presented above provide evidence that consumers rely upon 
affective decision making processes in forming judgments of product innovations.  
Judgments of risk and benefit were shown to be consistent with underlying affective 
evaluations and the pattern of results is consistent with the affect heuristic. The negative 
risk/benefit relationship discussed by Alhakami and Sovic (1994) and Finucane et al. 
(2000) regarding hazards was found to hold across a number of product innovations, 
individuals and manipulations. The results suggest that bottom-up analytical explanations 
of new product adoption decisions are not sufficient to explain the process and that top-
down, affective processes should also be considered.  
 The results of the first three studies each provided support for the hypotheses they 
were designed to test. Specifically, studies 1 and 2 provided support for hypothesis 1 by 
demonstrating an inverse relationship between perceptions of risk and benefit. In study 1, 
participants assigned to the analytical condition were asked to create lists of risks and 
benefits before forming their judgments. Participants assigned to this group, indicated a 
weaker relationship between perceptions of risk and benefit than those who were 
assigned to either the cognitive load or the control condition. 
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 Study 2 provided additional support for the first hypothesis by demonstrating that 
changes in one attribute (e.g., increases in risk perception) influence non-manipulated 
attributes (e.g., decreases in benefit) in an affectively congruent manner.  The 
overwhelming majority (10 of 12) of risk/benefit statements provided to participants 
produced the anticipated changes in the attribute that they were designed to manipulate. 
The results of the individual level changes were equally encouraging, showing that 
changes in the manipulated attribute generally produced affectively congruent changes in 
the non-manipulated attribute. 
  The results of study 3 and 4 provided support for hypothesis 2 by demonstrating 
that increases in the affective extremity of evaluations corresponded with greater 
differences in perceptions of risk and benefit. In study 3, participants were provided only 
with the opinions (e.g., like/dislike) of other study participants who were ostensibly also 
naïve. Those who were told that others disliked the innovations responded with neutral 
evaluations of the innovations. Whereas, those who were told that others liked the 
innovations, or who were not given any information about the other group’s preferences, 
evaluated the products favorably. Differences in risk and benefit closely matched changes 
in affect. Favorable evaluations corresponded with greater differences in risk and benefit 
whereas more neutral evaluations were associated with smaller differences. In this study, 
it was expected that negative information would decrease evaluations of the products. 
While participants who were provided negative information did lower their evaluations of 
the products, their average ratings were best characterized as neutral. This result may 
indicate the presence of a pro-innovation bias, whereby innovations are generally 
perceived as inherently favorable (Rogers 1976). Future research may explore stronger 
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negative manipulations in an effort to shift average evaluations below the midpoint on the 
scale. The affect heuristic would predict that as affective evaluations become increasingly 
negative, judgments of risk should become progressively larger than judgments of 
benefit. 
 Study 4 also found a positive relationship between affective extremity and 
perceived differences in judgments of risk and benefit, further supporting hypothesis 2.  
In study 4, a variety of attributes associated with the innovations were measured to 
determine if product attributes might moderate this relationship.  The results did not lend 
support to hypothesis 3a or 3b. Participants did not rely on affect to a greater extent when 
evaluating risks and benefits of more versus less hedonic products. Likewise, the 
utilitarian nature of the product was not found to moderate the relationship between affect 
and risk/benefit judgments.  
The unexpected results of the fourth study could be due to a number of 
possibilities. The distinction between hedonic and utilitarian products is somewhat 
enigmatic. Many products can be both utilitarian and hedonic, whereas others may be 
predominantly hedonic or utilitarian, or neither. Identifying product innovations that are 
uniquely hedonic or utilitarian poses a challenge. Even if such innovations can be 
identified, they may not reflect products which consumers are likely to encounter in the 
marketplace, creating concerns about external validity. An alternative approach may be to 
manipulate the benefits that consumers seek from using an innovation, rather than 
attributes of the innovation. For example, affect may be more relevant to decisions about 
an innovation that is expected to deliver experiential benefits (e.g., fun/enjoyment) 
whereas affect may be less relevant for decisions about an innovation which will have 
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instrumental uses (e.g., used for work; Pham 1998; Pham and Avnet 2009). However, the 
results of study 1 suggest that participants relied upon the affect heuristic as a default 
process for forming judgments across product categories. This may have also been the 
case in the fourth study.  It is possible that product level attributes may not influence the 
extent to which consumers rely upon affect when forming judgments of risk and benefit. 
Consumers may turn to affect as a default when making judgments of products about 
which they have little information. However, there are likely to be situational factors that 
motivate deliberate analytical evaluations that may reduce the reliance on affective 
decision processes. A challenge for future research is to continue to identify situations 
that may influence the process by which judgments are formed.  
One such possibility comes from recent research which suggests that regulatory 
focus may also moderate the use of the affect heuristic (Pham and Avnet 2009). The 
findings of a series of studies indicate that those who are promotion focused are more 
likely to rely upon affective decision processes to form evaluations. Promotion focused 
individuals prefer affective inputs when making decisions because they are thought to be 
relevant to their eagerness to form judgments. Future research may investigate the role of 
promotion versus prevention focus on moderating the use of affect in judgments of 
innovations. Existing work has already demonstrated that regulatory focus is related to 
the adoption of new products (Herzenstein, Posavac, and Brakus 2007), however research 
has not yet investigated the potential influence of affective decision making in explaining 
this relationship.  
 Together this series of studies contribute to our theoretical understanding of both 
the process by which consumers evaluate innovations and the affect heuristic. Despite 
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voluminous prior research on the topic, the potentially fundamental role of affect in new 
product evaluations has largely been overlooked. The findings from the four studies 
above make a contribution by serving as an initial demonstration of the importance of 
affect and the use of the affect heuristic in evaluations of innovations. This research 
marks a departure from the analytical cognitive processes that have been proposed to 
underlie the innovation adoption process. This research also makes a contribution by 
further incorporating heuristics and biases perspectives into research on innovation 
adoption. Heuristics and biases research is fundamentally an investigation of decision 
making under conditions of uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974); conditions that 
undoubtedly apply to innovation adoption decisions. Recent innovation research has 
begun to adopt perspectives from the heuristics and biases literature. While much remains 
to be done, future research should not overlook the importance of the affect heuristic. In 
his acceptance speech for the Nobel prize in economics, Daniel Kahneman (2003, 470) 
emphasized that “the idea of an affect heuristic is probably the most important 
development in the study of judgment heuristics in the last decades.” Additional 
examination of the role of the affect heuristic in innovation adoption decision making as 
well as other consumer behavior domains seems warranted. 
 The use of new products as a context also contributes to a theoretical 
understanding of the affect heuristic. Past research has argued that the affect heuristic is 
not dependent upon the retrieval of cognitively formed evaluations.  The results of the 
current studies support this assertion. The innovations used as stimuli in these studies 
were novel products that consumers had never encountered before and thus had no 
previously formed evaluations upon which to draw. Additionally, participants in each of 
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the studies were asked to make risk and benefit evaluations of specific products, as 
opposed to social hazards, from their own perspective, rather than from the prospective of 
society as a whole.  These conditions more closely match the types of judgments people 
are asked to make in the marketplace and extend our understanding of the types of 
judgments resulting from the use of the affect heuristic. 
For practitioners, the results of these studies highlight the importance of 
considering affective decision making styles in consumer evaluations of new products. 
The affect heuristic helps to address several important issues confronting marketers. First, 
the affect heuristic suggests an explanation for why first impressions are so important. 
Based on the findings above, failing to create a favorable affective evaluation during the 
launch of a new product will likely bias subsequent evaluations of the product’s attributes 
such that perceptions of the benefits associated with a product will be low and 
perceptions of risk will be high.  Similarly for market researchers testing product 
concepts, these findings provide an explanation for why consumers often find it difficult 
to objectively evaluate really new products (Hoeffler 2003). Rather than forming their 
evaluations by first understanding the attributes of a product, the affect heuristic suggests 
that consumers may look at their initial affective evaluation, and then pattern their 
responses in an affectively congruent fashion. If so, marketers testing new product 
concepts should be aware that a concerted effort may be required in order to get research 
participants to analytically evaluate a new product concept.  
 This research also addresses the question of why some attributes of a product are 
capable of compensating for others. The affect heuristic centers on the idea that when 
forming evaluations, people turn to affect, employing a top down strategy to form 
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affectively congruent evaluations of an object’s attributes.  If this strategy is used, 
specific risks (or benefits) of a product are likely to be overlooked if the product’s overall 
affective evaluation is favorable (unfavorable).  For marketers, this distinction carries real 
consequences. If consumer evaluations of an innovation’s attributes are biased by their 
holistic evaluation of the product, then communications emphasizing attributes that serve 
to increase the overall favorability of a product (e.g., increase perceptions of benefits), 
would be expected to produce affectively congruent changes in evaluations of attributes 
which may be completely unrelated (e.g., decrease perceptions of risk). This relationship 
between information about risks and benefits was shown in the second study. In 
developing communications, marketers may be able to rely on consumers to form 
affectively congruent inferences about the risks and benefits associated with a product 
without addressing them directly. For example, public health campaigns tasked with 
increasing the perceived risk associated with cigarette smoking could choose to focus on 
decreasing the perceived benefits associated with smoking. As shown in study 2, this 
information would be expected to decrease the favorability of smoking and thus increase 
perceptions of risk without addressing the risks directly. 
Together, these studies make a unique contribution by demonstrating that 
consumers turn to their feelings to form affectively congruent judgments of product 
innovations. The findings are important because they challenge the traditional view of 
innovation adoption decisions—suggesting that the process is not dependent upon purely 
analytical factors. Instead, consumers are shown to also rely upon their feelings to form 
judgments. Further, these studies demonstrate the use of the affect heuristic in a 
consumer context. The process of forming evaluations of innovations is particularly 
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interesting because of the high degree of uncertainty and the lack of existing attitudes, 
however the phenomena observed in these studies are likely to exist in other domains as 
well. Future consumer behavior research may benefit from exploring other contexts that 
promote or obstruct the use of the affect heuristic as a decision making strategy. 
 
NEXT ESSAY  
 
This essay demonstrated that consumers use affect to inform judgments 
surrounding product innovations.   The second essay asks the next logical question of 
where might this affect originate?  That is, if consumers rely upon affect to form 
judgments of products that they have never seen – then what prompts their affective 
reaction?  A number of sources likely contribute to these reactions, however many of 
these sources are likely to be idiosyncratic, tied to the unique experiences of the person 
and the product.  However, the ease or difficulty consumers experience processing 
information about the innovation (fluency) may serve as one generalized source of 
affective information.  The second essay explores how interpretations of processing 
experiences may contribute to affect that is used in making evaluations of novel stimuli.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
ESSAY 2: RE-EXAMINING THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN FLUENCY BASED 
JUDGMENTS OF RISK 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
A growing body of literature has provided evidence that experiences of fluency—
the subjective ease or difficulty associated with processing information—can serve as a 
distinct input for a wide variety of judgments.  For example, greater subjective ease of 
processing (fluent processing) has been found to be associated with more favorable 
evaluations (positive affect), feelings of greater confidence, and judgments of increased 
frequency and truthfulness (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009; Reber, Winkielman, and 
Schwarz 1998).  Fluency has been suggested to operate as a heuristic source of 
information (Schwarz and Vaughn 2002), underlying many of the decisions and intuitive 
judgments people make on a daily basis.  While several different types of fluency have 
been described within the literature, they have each been shown to provide remarkably 
similar influences on judgment and decision making.  
The usefulness of fluency experiences as an input to decision making has been 
shown to vary across situations.  When the source of the processing difficulty is called 
into question, people tend to discount the information provided by their processing 
experience and rely instead, upon the content retrieved (Schwarz et al. 1991). A number 
of different process theories have been put forth to explain these effects. Some authors 
have proposed that more fluent processing elicits a positive affective response (Reber, 
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Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004; Reber et al. 1998; Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001) that 
is then referenced as a basis for other judgments.  Others have suggested that these 
judgments stem from the relationship between fluent processing and increased estimates 
of frequency or familiarity (Johnston, Dark, and Jacoby 1985; Schwarz et al. 2007; Song 
and Schwarz 2009).  From this perspective, increased fluency leads to favorable 
judgments partly because familiarity is inferred to signal a more trustworthy source. 
More complicated models have also been proposed, suggesting that fluent processing 
experiences have both a direct relationship with positive affect as well as an indirect 
relationship that is dependent upon the inferences drawn from the experience (Fang, 
Singh, and Ahluwalia 2007). 
Recently, Song and Schwarz (2009) published a series of studies investigating the 
relationship between fluency experiences and perceptions of risk.  Their findings 
demonstrated that difficult to process stimuli were perceived as more risky relative to 
easily processed stimuli.  The differences in perceived risk were considered as evidence 
that processing experiences influence perceptions of risk primarily as a result of 
differences in perceived novelty (familiarity) and not because of affect associated with 
the processing experience. However, methodological limitations preclude such 
conclusions from the reported data and leave room for alternative interpretations.  The 
present research re-examines the studies reported by Song and Schwarz (2009) and offers 
evidence that fluency-elicited affect is related to risk perceptions.  Interestingly, the 
results of the current research do not contradict those reported by Song and Schwarz 
(2009), but the inclusion of additional measures help to clarify the processes that underlie 
the relationship between fluency experiences and the perception of risk. The purpose of 
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this research is not to refute the role of feelings of familiarity in influencing risk 
perceptions, but rather to explore if favorable affective reactions to processing 
experiences might also be related to perceived risk. 
This work offers contributions both to fluency research and to work investigating 
the role of favorable affect in perceptions of risk.  The results of the current research 
demonstrate that the effects of fluency on judgments are often relative, based on 
comparative rather than absolute processing difficulty. Further, differences in the 
interpretation of fluency experiences are shown to help explain the results reported by 
Song and Schwarz (2009).  The reported reversals in the meaning derived from 
processing experiences supports other recent research (Labroo and Kim 2009) which has 
found that individuals selectively apply different naïve theories to interpret fluency 
experiences depending upon salient goals. The application of different naïve theories can 
trigger divergent affective evaluations from similar processing experiences.   Further, the 
results of this research demonstrate that the relationship between favorable affective 
evaluations and perceived risk varies as a function of both goals and processing 
difficulty.  
The sections that follow summarize past research exploring affect as a basis for 
perceptions of risk, the role of naïve theories in understanding processing experiences, 
and the methodology used by Song and Schwarz (2009).  Then, three studies are 
presented which explore the influence of favorable affective evaluations, goals and 
fluency on judgments of risk and benefit.  Finally, this essay concludes by discussing the 
implications of the results both from theoretical and applied perspectives.  
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Naïve Theories and the Interpretation of Fluency Experiences  
 
To at least some extent, the effect of processing difficulty on different types of 
judgments is likely to depend on the naïve theories that are applied.  Naïve theories are 
assumptions about what a metacognitive experience means.  People apply different naïve 
theories to a context depending on their experience with similar situations.  These 
theories explain many of the effects associated with fluency experiences.  For example, 
the availability heuristic has been shown to occur because people make the assumption 
that instances that occur with a higher frequency are more easily recalled from memory 
than instances that occur with a lower frequency (Schwarz 2004).  In most situations, this 
assumption is valid; however, it can lead to incorrect judgments when people make the 
reverse inference that ease of processing is a signal of familiarity or frequency (Schwarz 
et al. 1991).  Similarly, people assume that familiar stimuli will be easier to process than 
novel stimuli. Supporting this idea, Whittlesea et al. (1990) found that words that were 
presented with greater visual clarity were more likely to be incorrectly recognized as 
having been presented on an earlier list.  Manipulations that make participants aware of 
the biasing influence of visual clarity eliminated the effect.  Thus, naïve theories provide 
an interpretive lens through which people infer meaning from processing experiences.    
While familiarity judgments are common, depending on the situation, fluency 
experiences may lead to a number of other inferences about the attributes of a particular 
stimulus.  For instance, a common finding is that more fluent processing leads to 
increased favorability (Reber et al. 2004; Reber et al. 1998; Winkielman and Cacioppo 
2001). Zajonc (1968) popularized the mere exposure effect, which has since spurred a 
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great amount of research.  Research has demonstrated that mere exposure effect can be 
explained by differences in fluency, as people tend to prefer recurring stimuli because 
they are perceptually easier to recognize, creating a sense of fluency (see: Bornstein and 
D'Agostino 1992; Bornstein and D'Agostino 1994; Fang et al. 2007; Whittlesea 1993).   
Psychophysiological studies have also provided evidence of a relationship 
between fluency and positive affect.  Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) used two 
different fluency manipulations (matched / mismatched contour primes and increased 
duration) to present stimuli in two experiments while participants were monitored by 
facial electromyography (EMG) sensors.  Stimuli that were easier to process (more 
fluent) were found to correspond with increased activation of muscles related to smiling 
(zygomaticus major) as well as more positive affective evaluations in self-reports. 
Most naïve theories lead decision makers to draw favorable inferences from fluent 
processing experiences and less favorable inferences from those that are less fluent.  
However, in some circumstances consumers may interpret disfluent processing 
experiences favorably. Alter and Oppenheimer (2009) have suggested that such a pattern 
might also exist:  
“Whereas one naïve theory might imply that a complex – and therefore disfluent – 
artwork is novel and interesting, a second naïve theory might classify complex, 
disfluent written prose as clumsy and awkward.  Thus, naïve theories bridge the 
gap between the experience of fluency and its implications for a particular 
judgment. (pg. 220)”  
Recent studies have begun to map boundary conditions regarding fluency effects and to 
document the contexts under which naïve theories lead to more favorable inferences from 
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disfluent processing experiences.  In one example, Briñol et al. (2006) directly 
manipulated the naïve theories that participants applied to their fluency experiences.  In 
their studies, participants were told that ease of processing was either good (e.g. because 
intelligent people generally have more complex thinking and more neuronal connections, 
so they often experience a feeling of difficulty when generating thoughts about a new 
issue – pg. 202), or that ease of processing was bad by reversing the instructions arguing 
that intelligence was linked with fluent processing.  The results revealed an interaction 
between fluency and the type of naïve theory applied by study participants, such that 
greater processing ease was associated with higher evaluations in the fluency-is-good 
condition, but was associated with lower evaluations in the fluency-is-bad condition. 
These findings provide compelling evidence that while fluency experiences serve as a 
ubiquitous input to decision making, the actual conclusions drawn from fluent processing 
may be open to interpretation and depend on the naïve theory that is applied.  
In everyday life however, naïve theories are not made as salient, or defined as 
explicitly, as they were in the Briñol et al. (2006) studies.  Rather, the specific naïve 
theory that is applied is inductively determined based upon the context, the type of 
judgment and the goals of the consumer. The matching of appropriate naïve theories to 
specific situations is learned through a lifetime of experience.  For example, people learn 
to apply the naïve theory underlying the availability heuristic because the ease of 
recalling an instance is usually informative about the frequency with which that instance 
occurs. However, in some instances interpreting highly accessible information as a signal 
of greater frequency may be inappropriate.   
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Nielsen and Escalas (2010), demonstrated that the effect of fluency can vary 
based upon the processing style used by consumers. Their results indicated that 
advertisements that are more fluent trigger a favorable interpretation when they are 
analytically processed.  However, advertisements evaluated using a narrative processing 
style produced reversals in which difficult processing was perceived as more favorable 
due to the inference that processing difficulty signaled a more complex (thus better) 
story.   
Another reversal in the interpretation of fluency was documented by Pocheptsova 
et al. (2010).  They found that greater difficulty associated with processing products and 
services intended for use during special occasions increased purchase intent, willingness 
to pay, and evaluations.  However, more fluent processing was preferred among products 
and services intended for every day use. This reversal was driven by naïve theories about 
the domain where the product was consumed.  Products intended for use on a special 
occasion are typically valued for being uncommon and distinctive. Greater processing 
difficulty associated with an object that is intended for a special occasion triggers the 
inference that the product is unique and special leading to increased evaluations.  When 
considering objects for everyday consumption, familiarity is desirable and ease of 
processing leads to improved evaluations. 
Closely related to the current research, Labroo and Kim (2009) demonstrated 
another reversal in the interpretation of fluency by manipulating the goals held by 
consumers.  They found that the effect of fluency on evaluations depends on whether an 
object is instrumental in achieving accessible goals.  Objects perceived as being 
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instrumental towards goal advancement were evaluated more favorably when presented 
in a difficult to process format as opposed to an easily processed format.   
For example, Labroo and Kim (2009) found that chocolates presented with greater 
fluency in an advertisement were preferred over those presented with less fluency if 
consumers held goals that could not be satisfied by consuming chocolates (e.g. goals of 
self control).  However, chocolates presented with less fluency were preferred if 
consumers held goals (e.g. feeling good) that could be satisfied by consuming chocolate. 
Again, differences in naïve theories explain this effect. People commonly associate goal 
advancement with the expenditure of effort.  As a result, when trying to reach a goal and 
to assess how useful an object will be in helping to achieve that goal, greater effort 
improves evaluations because the object is seen as more instrumental towards achieving 
the goal.  Greater difficulty was favored among those with feel-good goals because it 
increased the perceived instrumentality of chocolates in achieving a goal of feeling good. 
However, among those with neutral or self-control goals, difficult processing did not 
increase favorability because the achievement of those goals could not be achieved by 
consuming chocolate. 
 Reversals in preference due to the application of different naïve theories are 
relatively new to the fluency literature.  However, these studies provide strong evidence 
that meaning derived from a processing experience is not fixed, but rather depends on 
how it is interpreted. This begs the question of how these preference reversals might 
influence subsequent judgments. 
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The Affect Heuristic   
 
 Slovic et al. (2007) suggests that individuals often rely on an “affect heuristic” 
when making judgments.  The affect heuristic is based on the idea that when making a 
judgment, it is more efficient for people to rely on their overall affective impression of an 
object than it is to account for all available information.  Evidence for the affect heuristic 
has been provided by studies demonstrating that both the perceived benefit and risk of 
some target can be explained, in particular contexts, as the result of an individual’s more 
general affect toward the target (Finucane et al. 2000). Reliance on affect causes 
perceived risks and benefits to have an inverse relationship. Liking an object, therefore, 
triggers assessments of high benefits and low risks.  In contrast, disliking produces the 
opposite pattern.  Experimental manipulations increasing or decreasing perceptions of 
risk or benefit have been shown to produce an inverse, affectively congruent change in 
the non-manipulated attribute.  This pattern of results has been demonstrated under 
circumstances in which information about risks (benefits) is logically devoid of 
information about benefits (risks). A change in a participant’s affective evaluation 
(increased/decreased favorability) was implicated for this finding.  The affect heuristic 
appears to be relevant to fluency research because the experience of processing 
information may provide a source of affect that influences subsequent judgments of risk 
and benefit.   
Song and Schwarz (2009) recognized this possibility, acknowledging that positive 
affect should attenuate judgments of risk and increase judgments of benefits.   However, 
their results did not find support for the role of fluency-elicited affect in these judgments.  
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The experimental data presented to support their argument had limitations that leave 
room for the possibility that fluency-elicited affect underlies perceptions of risk and 
benefit. Below, this experimental evidence is explored in more detail and a plausible 
alternative interpretation that takes into account the affect heuristic and the role of naïve 
theories in determining the meaning of a fluency experience is presented.  
 
Fluency-Elicited Affect and Risk  
 
Song and Schwarz (2009) reported three experiments all of which manipulated 
fluency by altering the ease with which words could be pronounced.  In the first study, 
participants were presented with a list of ten food additives (five easy to pronounce, five 
difficult to pronounce). Study participants perceived greater potential harm (risk) from 
food additives with difficult to pronounce names than easily pronounced names.  The 
second study replicated this finding, but study participants also evaluated the novelty of 
the food additives. The results indicated that participants evaluated additives that were 
difficult to pronounce as being more novel than easier to pronounce substances.  The 
results also revealed a significant interaction between question order and fluency such 
that fluency was found to produce a greater effect on perceived novelty when the novelty 
question preceded the question about risk than when the risk question preceded the 
novelty question.  A mediational analysis indicated that novelty partially mediated the 
relationship between fluency and judgments of hazard.  However, because the study 
manipulated neither novelty nor hazardousness, the causal order of the relationship is 
difficult to establish. 
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 In a third study, Song and Schwarz (2009) examined the effects of fluency on 
perceptions of risk and benefit in an amusement park context.  The context is interesting 
because risk desirability is ambiguous.  Amusement parks offer the benefits of adventure 
and excitement, but also present risks, that include the possibility of making a person 
sick.  In their study, all participants were told to imagine that they were visiting an 
amusement park and were handed a brochure with the names of the rides offered. Next, 
study participants were assigned to one of two groups. Those assigned to the desirable-
risk condition received further instructions to imagine that they wanted to identify “very 
exciting and adventurous rides” on the basis of the brochure so that they “would not 
waste time on the dull ones.”  In contrast, those participants assigned to the undesirable-
risk condition received instructions to imagine that they were visiting the amusement 
park on “a day when you were not feeling very well” and that they wanted to avoid the 
rides that are “too risky and adventurous” and guess which “ones are the most risky and 
hence most likely to make you sick.”  In other words, participants in the undesirable-risk 
condition were given the goal of avoiding risk when evaluating the ride names whereas 
those in the desirable risk condition were given a risk-seeking goal when making their 
evaluations.  Participants in both conditions were then presented with three easily 
pronounced ride names (Chunta, Ohanzee and Tihkoosue) and three difficult to 
pronounce ride names (Vaiveahtoishi, Tsiischili, and Heammawihio) in one of two 
random orders.   
Surprisingly, participants in each goal condition evaluated ride names on different 
dependent measures.  Participants in the undesirable-risk condition evaluated the ride 
names on a 7-point scale risk scale with endpoints of (1) very safe to (7) very risky.  
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Whereas participants in the desirable-risk condition evaluated the same rides names on a 
7-point scale measuring how adventurous the rides were with endpoints of  (1) very dull 
and (7) very adventurous.  This adventurousness scale was then re-labeled as “desirable 
risk” but may be better conceptualized as a scale measuring the benefits expected from 
participants who were told to imagine that they wanted to identify  “very exciting and 
adventurous rides” on the basis of the brochure so that they would not “waste time on the 
dull ones.” 
The researchers predicted that if fluency-elicited affect underlies perceived risk, 
then more fluent names should produce judgments of less risk and greater benefits 
(mirroring the affect heuristic).  However, if familiarity drives fluency-based risk 
perception, then risk and benefit judgments should be the same for each fluency 
condition.  Despite these predictions, neither favorable affective evaluations of the ride 
names nor evaluations of novelty were reported for each condition.  However, a pre-test 
was conducted that indicated that easily pronounced names were perceived as more 
pleasant than difficult to pronounce names.  The remaining results from the third study 
are shown below in table 1. 
 Song and Schwarz (2009) analyzed their data with a 2 x 2 ANOVA with risk type 
(desirable vs. undesirable instructions) as one independent variable and fluency as a 
second independent variable (easy vs. hard to pronounce).  However, the results leave 
room for alternative interpretations because the dependent variable was different for each 
risk condition.  
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TABLE 1 
Original Results from Song and Schwarz (2009), Study 3 
Difficulty of name 
Benefit* Risk* 
(Risk-Seeking: dull to 
adventurous) 
(Risk-Avoidance: safe 
to risky) 
Easy to pronounce 3.06 (1.02) 3.02 (0.98) 
Hard to pronounce 4.04 (1.47) 4.35 (1.46) 
*These variables were originally labeled as desirable and undesirable risk. 
 
The analysis revealed a main effect of fluency on perceptions of desirable risks 
(i.e. benefits) and undesirable risks (risks) such that easily pronounced names were found 
to be less risky (safer) and less adventurous (duller) than difficult to pronounce names. 
No fluency x risk type interaction was observed.  However, the absence of a significant 
interaction may be the result of measuring different dependent variables for each risk 
condition. 
 Two conclusions may be made from the reported data, neither of which supports 
the primacy of familiarity or favorable affect in explaining the relationship between 
fluency and risk perception.  First, more difficult to pronounce ride names were judged as 
being more adventurous than easily pronounced ride names when participants were 
instructed to imagine that they should identify the most exciting and adventurous rides so 
as to not waste their time with the dull rides (risk-seeking goal).  Second, difficult to 
pronounce ride names were perceived as more risky than ride names that were easily 
pronounced when participants were instructed to imagine that they were not feeling very 
well and that they should try to identify which rides were too risky and adventurous so as 
to avoid them (risk-avoidance goal).   
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Despite these methodological concerns, Song and Schwarz (2009) concluded that 
because low processing fluency (i.e. difficult to pronounce ride names) increased both 
desirable (measured using very dull—very adventurous and better characterized as 
benefits) and undesirable (measured using very safe— very risky, and better 
characterized as risks) risk, the “pattern [of results] is compatible with the assumption 
that fluency influences risk perception through its effects on perceived novelty of the 
stimuli and is difficult to reconcile with the assumption that fluency-elicited affect plays a 
major role in the observed results” (pg. 138). Making this conclusion however, relies on 
the critical assumption that less fluent processing inherently produces negative affect 
even when participants are assigned to different goal conditions.  To their credit, Song 
and Schwarz (2009) pretested their stimuli and found that difficult to pronounce names 
were less pleasant (indicating affectively negative evaluations) than were easily 
pronounced names.  However, the results of this pre-test were not separated by risk 
instruction (goal) type.  Therefore, it is possible that participants who were asked to 
identify very exciting and adventurous rides so as to not waste any time on the dull rides 
may have selectively applied a naïve theory which caused them to interpret difficult to 
pronounce ride names (less fluent) favorably compared to easily pronounced ride names 
(more fluent).  Conversely, participants who were asked to imagine visiting an 
amusement park on a day when they were not feeling well, and that they should avoid the 
rides that are too risky and adventurous, may have selectively applied a naïve theory that 
led them to interpret difficult to pronounce ride names (less fluent) less favorably 
compared to easier to pronounce ride names (more fluent).  If this were the case, then an 
explanation of the results based on the affect heuristic would be plausible. Song and 
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Schwarz’s (2009) study, however, was not designed to test for a reversal in affective 
evaluations based on the selective application of different naïve theories.  The studies 
presented below explore this possibility. 
The affect heuristic predicts that people consult their feelings to construct 
judgments of risk and benefit.  This consultation explains the frequent observation that 
risks and benefits typically are perceived as being inversely related (Alhakami and Slovic 
1994; Finucane et al. 2000), despite objectively weak or even positive relationships in the 
real world.  Because risk typically has negative connotations, decreasing favorability 
(negative affective evaluations) usually leads to increased perceptions of risk and 
decreased perceptions of benefit.  However, in circumstances in which risk is a desirable 
attribute, the relationship between favorable affect and risk should be attenuated, while 
the positive relationship between favorable affective evaluations and perceived benefit 
should persist. 
Three studies are presented below that further explore the paradigm described by 
Song and Schwarz (2009). Each study explores the relationship between consumer goals 
and interpretations of fluency experiences while addressing several of the limitations of 
Song and Schwarz (2009) discussed above.  Chief among these, both risk and benefit are 
measured within each goal condition. In addition, affective evaluations (favorability) are 
collected with reference to goals rather than as a pre-test.  These additional measures 
make it possible to determine if the differences in perceived benefit and risk recorded by 
Song and Schwarz (2009) correspond with differences in favorable affect triggered by the 
selection of different naïve theories.   Studies 1 and 2 explore these relationships in the 
amusement park context used by Song and Schwarz (2009).  Study 3 attempts to replicate 
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the results using generic versus brand name medications while maintaining the 
assignment to risk-seeking or risk-avoidance goals. 
 
STUDY 1  
 
Study 1 follows Song and Schwarz (2009) closely.  Participants were assigned to 
either a risk-seeking goal or a risk-avoidance goal. However, fluency in this study was 
manipulated between subjects rather than within.  That is, each participant was presented 
with either three easily pronounced ride names (more fluent) or three difficult to 
pronounce ride names (less fluent).  The between subjects manipulation was employed to 
further understand the nature of fluency judgments.  
 
Method  
 
Eighty-seven undergraduate students from a large northwestern university were 
recruited in exchange for partial course credit.  Participants were told that the purpose of 
the study was to better understand how people evaluate amusement park rides.  The study 
design was a 2 (goal: risk-seeking, risk-avoidance) x 2 (fluency: fluent, disfluent) 
between subjects design.  All participants were told to imagine they were visiting an 
amusement park and had been handed a brochure with the names of the available rides.   
Participants were further instructed to read and sound out each name in their head. 
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Independent Variables 
 
Goal.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of two goal conditions from 
Song and Schwarz (2009) study 3.  Participants in the risk-seeking goal condition were 
told to imagine that they want to identify very exciting and adventurous rides on the basis 
of the brochure so that they would not waste time on dull rides.  Participants assigned to 
the risk-avoidance goal condition were told to imagine that their amusement-park visit 
fell on a day when they were not feeling well and that they wanted to avoid rides that 
were too risky and adventurous on the basis of the brochure.  They were further 
instructed that they should try to guess which rides were the most risky and hence the 
most likely to make them sick. 
 
Fluency. Fluency was manipulated by varying the ease of pronunciation of the 
ride names participants were given.  Participants were presented with a list of either 
easily pronounced roller-coaster ride names (Chunta, Ohanzee, and Tihkoosue) or a list 
of difficult to pronounce names (Vaiveahtosishi, Tsiichili, and Heammawihio) in a 
random order.  A pre-test confirmed that the two lists of ride names differed on the basis 
of how easy they were to pronounce (t(21) = 9.70, p < .01). 
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Dependent Measures  
 
Favorability. Favorability evaluations of the ride names were collected using 
three 9-point semantic differential items (favorable-unfavorable, good-bad, like-dislike).  
The mean response was used to form an overall measure of favorable affect (α = .90).  
 
Risk and Benefit.  Risk and benefit evaluations associated with each ride were 
collected using two 9-point semantic differential items (very risky-not at all risky, very 
beneficial–not at all beneficial). 
 
Results  
 
Means and standard deviations for the dependent measures are shown in table 2 
and correlations between the variables are shown in table 3. A hierarchical linear 
regression was conducted to determine the effects of goal condition and fluency on 
favorability evaluations.  The regression of favorable affect onto goal condition and 
fluency was not statistically significant (F(2,84) = .66, n.s., R2 = .01) and the addition of 
the interaction term representing the interaction between goal condition and fluency on 
favorability evaluations did not significantly improve the model as evidenced by a non-
significant increase in R2 (Fchange(1,83) < .01, n.s., R2Change < .01).   
A similar analysis was conducted to test for the effects of goal condition, fluency 
and favorability evaluations on benefit perceptions.  A regression equation including the  
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TABLE 2 
Mean Values on Dependent Measures by Goal Condition and Fluency – Study 1  
  Goal 
DV Fluency Risk-Seeking     Risk-Avoidance 
Favorability Easy to pronounce 5.26 (1.08)  5.11 (  .70) Difficult to pronounce 5.18 (1.33)  4.99 (  .89) 
      
   
Risk Easy to pronounce 5.24 (1.14)  
4.94   (  .96) 
Difficult to pronounce 5.31 (1.12) 
 
5.33 (  .83) 
       
Benefit 
Easy to pronounce 4.68 (1.07) 
 
4.63 (  .82) 
Difficult to pronounce 4.64 (1.15) 
 
4.03 (1.77) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
 
Bold indicates values for variables similar to those reported by 
Song and Schwarz (2009) 
 
Increasing values indicate increasing favorability, risk or benefit 
respectively 
  
  
 
main effects terms was significant (F(3,83) = 23.67, p < .01, R2 = .46). Favorability 
evaluations were found to be the only significant predictor of benefit perception (b = .81, 
t(86) = 8.11, p < .01). Thus, increasing favorability was found to be positively associated 
with increased perceptions of benefits (roverall = .67, p < .01). None of the interaction 
terms representing the interactions between goals, fluency or favorable affect on 
perceptions of benefit were found to be significant as evidenced by non-significant 
improvements in R2 among those models that included the interaction terms.  
A final regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the influence of goal 
condition, fluency and favorable affect on risk perceptions. The regression of risk 
perception onto goal condition, fluency and favorable affect was not significant (F(3,83) 
= .52, n.s., R2 = .02). None of the interactions between goals, fluency or favorable affect  
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TABLE 3 
Correlations Among Measured Variables - Study 1  
Risk-Seeking 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability 
  2. Risk  .55**  
3. Benefit  .82**  .33 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.14  
3. Benefit  .88** -.12 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk  .14  
3. Benefit  .85**  .08 
    Risk-Avoidance 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability 
  2. Risk -.33  
3. Benefit  .60** -.34 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk  .05  
3. Benefit  .49* -.03 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.13  
3. Benefit  .50** -.16 
    Overall 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability 
  2. Risk  .27  
3. Benefit  .75**  .09 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.08  
3. Benefit  .64** -.07 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk  .06  
3. Benefit  .67** -.03 
    **p ≤ .01 
    *p ≤ .05 
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on perceptions of risk were significant as evidenced by non-significant improvements in 
R2 among those models that included the interaction terms. An examination of the 
correlation coefficients revealed a single significant relationship between favorability and 
perceptions of risk among those assigned risk-seeking goals who evaluated fluent ride 
names (r = .55, p < .01). 
 
Discussion  
 
Using a between subjects manipulation of fluency, study 1 failed to replicate the findings 
of Song and Schwarz (2009).  The only significant finding from the regression analysis 
was a strong positive relationship between favorability and benefit.   As expected, 
increased favorability corresponded with increased benefit.  Unexpectedly, the analysis 
found no significant main effect of favorable affect on perceived risk.  Further, no 
significant relationships between risk and benefit or between risk and favorability across, 
or within, any of the conditions was found. The single exception was a positive 
relationship that was observed between favorable affect and perceptions of risk among 
those assigned risk-seeking goals and presented with easy to pronounce ride names. The 
absence of variation in favorable affective evaluations as well as benefit or risk as a 
function of either manipulated variable suggests that fluency effects may be comparative 
rather than absolute in nature.  Therefore, study 2 incorporated a within subjects 
manipulation of fluency in which all participants were presented with both easily 
pronounced and difficult to pronounce ride names.  
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STUDY 2  
 
 Study 2 again closely followed the design of Song and Schwarz (2009) study 3. 
However, as in study 1, favorable affect as well as perceptions of risk and benefit for 
each ride name were collected.  In this study, participants were assigned to either a risk-
seeking or a risk-avoidance goal, then were presented with both easy and difficult to 
pronounce ride names.   
 
Method  
 
Sixty-six undergraduate students from a large northwestern university participated 
in exchange for partial course credit. Instructions, manipulations and measures were the 
same as those used in study 1. However, the design was a 2 (goal: risk-seeking, risk-
avoidance) x 2 (fluency: fluent, disfluent) mixed design with the first factor between 
subjects and the second factor within subjects rather than a fully between subjects design 
as was used in the first study. 
 
Results   
 
Means and standard deviations for the dependent measures are shown in table 4 
and correlations between the variables are shown in table 5. A mixed model hierarchical 
linear regression analysis was conducted following the within-subject contrast approach 
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for repeated measures models outlined by Judd (2000; see appendix C).  The regression 
coefficients for studies 2 and 3 are shown in table 6. 
 
Affective Evaluations. The results indicate the absence of significant main effects 
for both goals (b01) and fluency (b10) on favorable affect. However, the fluency by goals 
interaction was significant (b11 = -.53, SE = .19, t(65) = 2.71, p < .01).  This indicates that 
risk-seeking participants evaluated rides with disfluent, difficult to pronounce names 
more favorably (M = 5.25) than rides with fluent, easy to pronounce names (M = 4.96).  
Among risk avoiders, the opposite pattern of results emerged, with participants 
evaluating fluent, easy to pronounce ride names more favorably (M =5.30) than disfluent, 
difficult to pronounce ride names (M = 4.54).  The preference reversal demonstrates that  
 
TABLE 4 
 Mean Values on Dependent Measures by Goal Condition and Fluency – Study 2  
 
  Goal 
DV Fluency Risk-Seeking   Risk-Avoidance 
Favorability Easy to pronounce 4.96 (1.13)  5.30 (  .87) Difficult to pronounce 5.25 (1.45)  4.54 (  .86) 
       
Risk Easy to pronounce 4.67 (1.01)  4.89 (1.20) Difficult to pronounce 5.34 (1.31)  5.74 (1.45) 
       
Benefit Easy to pronounce 4.60 (1.01)  5.20 (  .91) Difficult to pronounce 5.01 (1.43)  4.31 (  .94) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
 
Bold indicates values for variables similar to those reported by 
Song and Schwarz (2009) 
 
Increasing values indicate increasing favorability, risk or benefit 
respectively 
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TABLE 5 
Correlations Among Measured Variables - Study 2  
Risk-Seeking 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability 
  2. Risk -.12  
3. Benefit  .85**  .08 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.24  
3. Benefit  .92** -.31 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.15  
3. Benefit  .89** -.11 
    Risk-Avoidance 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.65**  
3. Benefit  .73** -.44** 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.35*  
3. Benefit  .62** -.23 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.58**  
3. Benefit  .73** -.44** 
    Overall 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.35**  
3. Benefit  .81** -.14 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.31**  
3. Benefit  .84** -.31** 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.34**  
3. Benefit  .83** -.26** 
    **p ≤ .01 
     *p ≤ .05 
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Table 6 
 
Regression Coefficients - Studies 2 and 3 
 
    Study 2  Study 3 
b Effect b SE t p 
 
b SE t p 
D
V
: B
en
ef
its
 
01 Goal -.05 .06   -.77 n.s.  -.20 .08 2.40   .02 
02 Favorability   .72 .10   7.39 <.01    .80 .11 7.01 <.01 
03 Goal x Favorability   .16 .10   1.64 n.s.  -.08 .11   .74 n.s. 
10 Fluency   .28 .12   2.44   .02    .31 .13 2.40   .02 
11 Fluency x Goal -.20 .12   1.73 n.s.  -.34 .13 2.64   .01 
12 Favorability x Fluency   .85 .07 11.96 <.01    .69 .07 9.44 <.01 
13 Favorability x Goal x Fluency   .06 .07     .82 n.s.    .09 .07 1.26 n.s.  
 
        
  
D
V
: R
is
k 
01 Goal -.11 .09   1.31 n.s.    -.06 .07   .74 n.s. 
02 Favorability  -.41 .14   2.84   .01      .49 .10 4.80 <.01 
03 Goal x Favorability    .06 .14     .44 n.s.      .14 .10 1.39 n.s. 
10 Fluency -.55 .21   2.65   .01  -1.26 .18 6.94 <.01 
11 Fluency x Goal -.10 .21     .46   .65      .02 .18   .12 n.s. 
12 Favorability x Fluency -.36 .13   2.78   .01    -.41 .10 4.02 <.01 
13 Favorability x Goal x Fluency   .40 .13   3.15 <.01      .21 .10 2.08   .04  
 
        
  
D
V
: 
Fa
vo
ra
bi
lit
y 
01 Goal   .10 .09   1.02 n.s.    .25 .08 3.26 <.01 
10 Fluency   .23 .19   1.20 n.s.    .98 .20 4.85 <.01 
11 Fluency x Goal -.53 .19   2.71   .01  -.46 .20 2.30   .02 
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different goals can produce different interpretations of fluency experiences.  Risk seekers 
preferred less fluent ride names, whereas risk avoiders favored more fluent ride names.  It 
is possible that participants in Song and Schwarz (2009) may have experienced a similar 
change in preferences based on goal but that this effect was not found because favorable 
affect was measured without considering the goals held by participants.  
 
 
Benefit Perceptions. The main effect of goal on benefit perceptions (b01) was not 
significant. However, a significant main effect of favorable affective evaluations on 
perceptions of benefits was found (b02 = .72, SE = .10, t(65) = 7.39, p < .01). Across 
fluency conditions, more favorable affective evaluations correspond with increasing 
perceptions of benefits among each goal condition as predicted by the affect heuristic. 
The main effect of fluency on benefit perceptions was also found to be significant (b10 = 
.28, SE = .12, t(65) = 2.44, p = .02), indicating that the perceived benefits of easily 
pronounced ride names were greater than difficult to pronounce ride names after 
controlling for differences in favorable affective evaluations. 
 Main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between favorable 
affective evaluations and fluency (b12 = .85, SE = .07, t(65) = 11.96, p < .01). The 
positive regression coefficient indicates that as the benefits associated with easily 
pronounced ride names increased relative to difficult to pronounce ride names, easily 
pronounced ride names were favored over more difficult to pronounce ride names. An 
examination of the correlations between favorable affective evaluations and benefit 
perceptions clarifies this relationship (see table 5).  The correlation between favorable 
 92 
 
 
affective evaluations and perceived benefit was weaker (r = .81, p < .01) among easily 
pronounced ride names than among difficult to pronounce ride names (r = .84, p < .01).   
Additionally, the interaction between fluency and goal condition was marginally 
significant (b11 = -.20, SE = .12, t(65) = 1.73, p = .09). This trend indicated that, 
controlling for differences in favorable affective evaluations between fluency conditions, 
participants assigned risk-seeking goals tended to evaluate difficult to pronounce rides as 
being more beneficial than easily pronounced ride names. In contrast, those assigned risk-
avoidance goals tended to evaluate easy to pronounce ride names as more beneficial than 
difficult to pronounce ride names. Finally, the term (b13) representing the interaction 
between differences in favorable affective evaluations between easy and difficult to 
pronounce ride names (WS1i) with goals (Xi) on differences in perceptions of benefit 
between easy and difficult to pronounce names (W1i) was not significant.  This indicates 
that the effect of favorable affect differences between fluency conditions on benefit 
differences between fluency conditions does not vary as a function of the goals held by 
participants. 
 
Risk Perceptions. The main effect of goal on risk perceptions was not found to be 
significant. However, as predicted by the affect heuristic, a significant main effect of 
favorable affective evaluation on risk was found (b02 = -.41, SE = .14, t(65) = 2.84, p < 
.01). Across fluency conditions, more favorable affective evaluations were found to 
correspond with reduced perceived risk for those in each goal condition. The main effect 
of fluency on risk perceptions was also found to be significant (b10 = -.55, SE = .21, t(65) 
= 2.65, p = .01), indicating that there were fewer perceived risks among easily 
 93 
 
 
pronounced ride names compared to difficult to pronounce ride names after controlling 
for differences in favorable affective evaluations. 
 In addition to these main effects, significant interactions were also found. A 
significant interaction was observed between fluency and favorable affective evaluations 
(b12 = -.36, SE = .13, t(65) = 2.78, p <.01). The negative regression coefficient indicates 
that as the risks associated with easily pronounced ride names increased, relative to 
difficult to pronounce ride names, more difficult to pronounce ride names were favored 
over easier to pronounce ride names. An examination of the correlations between 
favorable affect and risk perceptions clarifies this relationship. Favorable Affective 
evaluations were found to be more strongly predictive of risk perceptions among easily 
pronounced ride names (r = -.35, p < .01) than among more difficult to pronounce ride 
names (r = -.31, p = .01).  
The interaction between fluency and goal condition (b11) on risk evaluations was 
not significant indicating that after controlling for differences in favorable affective 
evaluations, the effect of fluency on risk perception did not depend on the goals held by 
participants. Finally, the term representing the interaction between favorable affective 
differences and goals on risk differences was found to be significant (b13 = .40, SE = .13, 
t(65) = 3.15, p <.01). This indicates that the ability of favorable affect differences 
between fluency conditions to predict risk differences between fluency conditions 
depends on the goals held by participants. The positive relationship indicates that the 
difference in favorable affect between fluency conditions was more predictive of risk 
differences between fluency conditions among those assigned avoidance goals than 
among those assigned risk-seeking goals. This interaction is graphically depicted 
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following the procedures outlined in Aiken and West (1991) in figure 1. Among risk 
avoiders, the relationship between WS1 and W1 was negative. This negative relationship 
indicates that as the favorability of easily pronounced ride names increased relative to 
difficult to pronounce ride names (WS1 Low to WS1 High), the perceived risks 
associated with easily pronounced ride names decreased relative to difficult to pronounce 
ride names.  However, among those assigned to risk-seeking goals, the relationship 
between WS1 and W1 was weak.  The lack of slope indicates that as favorability of 
easily pronounced ride names increased relative to difficult to pronounce ride names 
(WS1 Low to WS1 High), the risks associated with difficult to pronounce ride names did 
not change relative to easily pronounced ride names.   
To clearly illustrate this interaction, the correlations between favorable affective 
evaluations and perceptions of risk were considered for each goal by fluency condition 
(see table 5).  Among risk avoiders, the correlation between favorable affective 
evaluations and risk when evaluating easy to pronounce ride names was r = -.65 (p < .01) 
and r = -.35 (p = .04) among difficult to pronounce ride names.   The relationships 
between favorable affective evaluations and risk were weaker among risk seekers.  For 
risk seekers, the correlation between these two variables was r = -.12 (n.s.) for easily 
pronounced ride names and r = -.24 (n.s.) among difficult to pronounce ride names.  
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FIGURE 1 
INTERACTION BETWEEN GOALS AND WS1 (DIFFERENCES IN 
FAVORABILITY EVALUATIONS BETWEEN FLUENCY CONDITIONS) ON W1 
(DIFFERENCES IN RISK PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN FLUENCY CONDITIONS) - 
STUDY 2 
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Study 2 Discussion  
 
The results of study 2 stand in contrast to those of study 1.  The within subjects 
manipulation of fluency used in study 2 produced a number of significant effects that 
were not present with the between subjects manipulation used in study 1. This difference 
does not appear to be attributable to the greater statistical power offered by the within 
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subjects design of study 2.  The second study included fewer participants than were used 
in the first study (n = 66 versus n = 87).  In addition, the differences observed in study 1 
were relatively small compared to those found in the second study.  Instead, the 
differences in results between the two studies indicate that the influence of ease of 
processing on judgment may be best characterized as a comparative rather than an 
absolute process. It appears that the relative ease or difficulty of processing informs 
judgment to a greater extent than the absolute ease of processing.  Participants who were 
able to compare easily pronounced names to difficult to pronounce ride names (study 2) 
formed different judgments than those who were presented with only easy, or only 
difficult to pronounce ride names (study 1). 
In addition, the results of study 2 replicated the findings reported by Song and 
Schwarz (2009). Risk seekers indicated greater benefits among difficult to pronounce ride 
names than among easily pronounced ride names.  In addition, risk avoiders found 
difficult to pronounce ride names to be more risky than easy to pronounce ride names 
(compare tables 1 and 4).  However, study 2 also measured favorable affective 
evaluations, as well as risk and benefit perceptions in all conditions.  The analysis of 
these additional measures indicated that preferences for fluent versus disfluent ride names 
reversed as a function of the goals held by participants.  Among risk seekers, difficult to 
pronounce ride names were preferred over easily pronounced ride names.  Risk avoiders 
preferred the opposite and evaluated ride names that were easily pronounced more 
favorably than ride names that were more difficult to pronounce.  The interaction 
between goals and fluency illuminates the interpretation of the remaining results. 
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As predicted by the affect heuristic, more favorable affective evaluations were 
found to correspond with increased benefits and decreased risks in all conditions.  
However, the strength of these relationships varied based upon differences in goals and 
processing difficulty.  Differences in favorable affect between fluency conditions (WS1) 
was found to predict differences in benefit perceptions between fluency conditions 
regardless of the goals held by study participants.  In contrast, the ability of favorable 
affect differences between fluency conditions to predict risk differences between fluency 
conditions was found to depend on the goals held by participants.  The relationship was 
stronger among risk avoiders and weaker among risk seekers.   
The results are compatible with the idea that risks, among risk seekers, are 
desirable and match with the observed reversal in affective evaluations based upon the 
interaction between fluency and goals.   As a whole, the results demonstrate that 
favorable affective evaluations predict risk and benefit perceptions.  However, 
differences in favorable affective evaluations between fluent and disfluent ride names 
were more predictive of differences in risk perceptions among risk avoiders than among 
risk seekers.   
  
STUDY 3  
 
Study 3 was designed to test whether the findings from study 2 could be 
replicated in another context. In study 3, fluency was manipulated by altering the 
difficulty associated with pronouncing prescription drug names.  Medications were 
selected because they often carry both a brand name that is easy to pronounce and a 
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generic name that is more difficult to pronounce.  In addition, the risks associated with 
medications may be desirable or undesirable depending on the goals of those who 
evaluate them.  In many situations, patients may try to select safe medications with 
minimal side effects and minimal potential for interactions with other drugs.  However, 
medications are also promoted based on strength along with claims that stronger 
medications are more effective or are faster to resolve symptoms.  In study 3, participants 
were either told to imagine that they wanted to select the safest medication possible to 
treat an illness or to select the strongest medication possible to treat an illness.  Following 
the instructions, all participants were presented with a randomized list of three different 
medications presented using both the generic and brand name.  Participants were asked to 
complete the same measures used in studies 1 and 2. 
 
Method  
 
Eighty-one undergraduate students from a large northwestern university 
participated in exchange for partial course credit.  Instructions informed participants that 
the purpose of the study was to better understand how people evaluate prescription 
medications. The design was a 2 (goal: risk-seeking, risk-avoidance) x 2 (fluency: fluent, 
disfluent) mixed design with the first factor between subjects and the second factor 
within subjects.   All participants received instructions asking them to imagine that 
someone they knew had been diagnosed with a serious medical condition and that a 
physician had suggested several medications which could be taken to help treat the 
illness.  Each of the medication was evaluated using the favorability, risk and benefit 
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measures that were used in the first and second study. A manipulation check was also 
included, and any participants who were familiar with any of the medication names were 
removed from the analysis. 
 
Independent Variables  
 
Goal.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of two goal conditions, both of 
which represented a promotion regulatory focus.  Participants in the risk-seeking goal 
condition were told that the person who was sick wanted to get well as soon as possible 
and should therefore try to identify the strongest and most effective medicines from the 
list.  Participants assigned to the risk-avoidance goal condition were told that the person 
who was sick often had had complications when taking medications so they should 
choose the safest medication to treat their condition.   
 
Fluency. All participants received a list of actual medications that included three 
fluent, easily pronounced medication names (Tegretol, Vasotec, Gleevec) and three 
disfluent, difficult to pronounce medication names (Carbamazepine, Enalapril Maleate, 
Imatinib Mesylate) in random order.  A pre-test confirmed that the fluent and disfluent 
medications differed on the basis of how easy they were to pronounce (t(113) = 25.58, p 
< .01). Both the easy and difficult to pronounce drug names were actually different names 
for identical medications. The difficult to pronounce medication names were the generic 
drug names, whereas the easily pronounceable medication names were the brand names 
of the drugs. 
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Results  
 
Means and standard deviations for the dependent measures are shown in table 7 
and correlations between the variables are shown in table 8. The analysis followed that of 
study 2 (see Appendix C). Regression coefficients from this analysis are shown in table 6. 
 
TABLE 7 
Mean Values on Dependent Measures by Goal Condition and Fluency – Study 3  
 
  Goal 
DV Fluency Risk-seeking   Risk-Avoidance 
Favorability Easy to pronounce 5.59 (1.18)  5.55 (0.96) Difficult to pronounce 5.08 (1.24)  4.11 (1.12) 
       
Risk Easy to pronounce 4.46 (1.13)  4.64 (0.96) Difficult to pronounce 5.66 (1.13)  6.20 (1.14) 
       
Benefit Easy to pronounce 5.06 (1.25)  5.70 (0.76) Difficult to pronounce 5.42 (1.27)  4.74 (1.46) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
 
Bold indicates values for variables similar to those reported 
by Song and Schwarz (2009) 
 
Increasing values indicate increasing favorability, risk or 
benefit respectively   
 
Affective Evaluations. The analysis indicated a significant main effect for both 
goals (b01 = .25, SE = .08, t(80) = 3.26, p < .01) and fluency (b10 = .98, SE = .20, t(80) = 
4.85, p < .01) on favorable affective evaluations.  On average, risk seekers evaluated the 
medication names more favorably than risk avoiders. Further, easily pronounced (brand  
 101 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Correlations Among Measured Variables - Study 3  
Risk-Seeking 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability 
  2. Risk -.43**  
3. Benefit  .73** -.24 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.11  
3. Benefit  .73**  .11 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.33**  
3. Benefit  .67**  .01 
    Risk-Avoidance 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability 
  2. Risk -.51**  
3. Benefit  .67** -.22 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.69**  
3. Benefit  .64** -.38* 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.75**  
3. Benefit  .70** -.47** 
    Overall 
  
1 2 
Fluent 
1. Favorability 
  2. Risk -.46**  
3. Benefit  .67** -.20 
Disfluent 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.41**  
3. Benefit  .70** -.17 
Overall 
1. Favorability   
2. Risk -.53**  
3. Benefit  .67** -.20** 
    **p ≤ .01 
    *p ≤ .05 
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name) medications were preferred over difficult to pronounce (generic) medications. 
These effects were qualified by a significant goal x fluency interaction (b11 = -.46, SE = 
.20, t(80) = 2.30, p = .02).  Risk seekers evaluated medications with easily pronounced 
names (M = 5.59) as being nearly equally favorable to risk avoiders (M = 5.55).  
However, difficult to pronounce medication names were evaluated more favorability 
among risk seekers (M = 5.08) relative to risk avoiders (M = 4.11).  
 
Benefit Perceptions. The analysis indicated a significant main effect of goals on 
benefit perceptions (b01 = -.20, SE = .08, t(80) = 2.40, p = .02).  Risk-seeking participants 
perceived all medications to be more beneficial on average than risk avoiders. A 
significant main effect of favorable affective evaluations on perceptions of benefits was 
also found (b02 = .80, SE = .11, t(80) = 7.01, p < .01). As predicted by the affect heuristic, 
across fluency and goal conditions, more favorable affective evaluations of the 
medications correspond with increased benefits. The main effect of fluency on benefits 
was also significant (b10 = .31, SE = .13, t(80) = 2.40, p = .02), indicating that the 
perceived benefits of easily pronounced medications were greater than difficult to 
pronounce medications after controlling for differences in favorable affect. 
 Paralleling the results of study 2, the main effects were also qualified by a 
significant fluency x favorable affect interaction (b12 = .69, SE = .07, t(80) = 9.44, p < 
.01). The positive regression coefficient indicates that as the benefits associated with 
easily pronounced medications increased, they became preferred over more difficult to 
pronounce medications. The correlations between favorable affective evaluations and 
benefit perceptions were also examined (see table 8).  The relationship between favorable 
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affective evaluations and perceptions of benefit was weaker (r = .67, p < .01) among 
easily pronounced medications than among difficult to pronounce medications (r = .70, p 
< .01).  
Additionally, the fluency x goal interaction was significant (b11 = -.34, SE = .13, 
t(80) = 2.64, p = .01). This interaction indicates that, controlling for favorability 
differences between fluency conditions, risk seekers evaluated medications that were 
difficult to pronounce as being more beneficial than easily pronounced medications. In 
contrast, risk avoiders evaluated easily pronounced medications as more beneficial than 
difficult to pronounce medications. Finally, the term representing the interaction between 
favorability differences between fluency conditions and goals on benefit differences 
between fluency conditions (b13) was not significant.  This indicates that the effect of 
favorability differences between fluency conditions on benefit differences between 
fluency conditions does not vary as a function of the goals held by participants. 
 
Risk Perceptions. No main effect of goals on risk was found. However, a 
significant main effect of favorable affect on risk was found (b02 = - .49, SE = .10, t(80) = 
4.80, p < .01). Across fluency conditions, more favorable evaluations correspond with 
increased perceptions of risk for each goal condition. The main effect of fluency on risk 
was also significant (b10 = -1.26, SE = .18, t(80) = 6.94, p < .01), indicating that there 
were fewer perceived risks of easily pronounced medications compared to difficult to 
pronounce medications after controlling for favorability differences. 
 A significant fluency x favorable affect interaction (b12 = -.41, SE = .10, t(80) = 
4.02, p < .01) was also found.  The coefficient indicates that as perceptions of risks 
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associated with easily pronounced medications increased relative to difficult to 
pronounce medications, difficult to pronounce medications were favored over more 
easily pronounced medications. An examination of the correlations between favorable 
affective evaluations and risk perceptions clarifies this relationship.  The correlation 
between favorable affective evaluations and perceptions of risk was stronger (r = -.46, p 
< .01) among easily pronounced ride names than among difficult to pronounce ride 
names (r = -.41, p < .01). 
The fluency x goal interaction (b11) on risk evaluations was not significant 
indicating that after controlling for favorability differences, the effect of fluency on risk 
perception did not depend on the goals held by participants. Finally, the term representing 
the interaction between favorability differences and goals on risk differences was 
significant (b13 = .21, SE = .10, t(80) = 2.08, p = .04). The interaction indicates that the 
ability of favorability differences across fluency conditions to predict risk differences 
across fluency conditions depends on the goals held by participants.  The positive 
relationship indicates that favorability difference between fluency conditions was more 
predictive of risk differences between fluency conditions among risk avoiders than 
among those risk seekers. This interaction is shown in figure 2. As in study 2, the 
relationship between WS1 and W1 was negative among risk avoiders indicating that as 
the favorability of easily pronounced drug names increased relative to difficult to 
pronounce medication names (WS1 Low to WS1 High), the perceived risks associated 
with easily pronounced drug names decreased relative to difficult to pronounce drug 
names.  Further mirroring the results of study 2, among risk seekers, the relationship 
between WS1 and W1 was weaker.  The reduced slope indicates that as favorability of 
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easily pronounced drug names increases relative to difficult to pronounce drug names 
(WS1 Low to WS1 High), the risks associated with difficult to pronounce medication 
names did not change relative to easily pronounced drug names to the same extent as for 
risk avoiders.   
The correlations between favorable affective evaluations and perceptions of risk 
were considered for each goal by fluency condition (see table 8).  Among risk avoiders, 
the correlation between favorable affect and risk when evaluating easily pronounced 
medication names was  r = -.51 (p <.01) and r = -.69 (p = .04) among difficult to 
pronounce medications. As in study 2, the relationships between favorable affect and 
perceptions of risk were weaker among risk seekers. For those with risk-seeking goals, 
the correlation between these two variables was r = -.43 (p < .01) for easily pronounced 
medications and r = -.11 (n.s.) among difficult to pronounce medications. 
 
Study 3 Discussion  
 
 Study 3 replicated the principal results of the second study using a different 
context and with an alternative set of words to manipulate fluency.  Again, a significant  
interaction was observed between goals and fluency on favorable affective evaluations.  
However, unlike study 2, difficult to pronounce (generic) medications were not preferred 
over easily pronounced (brand name) medications, even among those with risk-seeking 
goals.  Instead, evaluations of easy to pronounce medications remained consistently 
favorable in both goal conditions. Goals did produce a noticeable change in evaluations 
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of difficult to pronounce medication names. Less fluent medication names were evaluated 
more favorably by risk seekers than risk avoiders, matching the results from study 2. 
 
FIGURE 2 
INTERACTION BETWEEN GOALS AND WS1 (DIFFERENCES IN 
FAVORABILITY EVALUATIONS BETWEEN FLUENCY CONDITIONS) ON W1 
(DIFFERENCES IN RISK PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN FLUENCY CONDITIONS) - 
STUDY 3   
 
 
Evidence was also found to support the role of affect in judgments of risk and 
benefit.  As in study 2, favorable affective evaluations were negatively related to risk and 
positively related to benefit in all conditions. Also in line with study 2 results, 
favorability differences between fluency conditions predicted benefit differences between 
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fluency conditions equally well for risk seekers and risk avoiders.  However, favorability 
differences between fluency conditions were more predictive of risk differences among 
risk avoiders than risk seekers. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 
Metacognitive experiences of fluency are known to influence a variety of 
judgments, yet the process underlying these effects has been debated.  The recent 
research reported by Song and Schwarz (2009) found no support for the hypothesis that 
fluency-elicited affect informs risk judgments.  Instead, their results suggested that 
fluency influences risk perception only through differences in familiarity.  The present 
research re-examined the experimental paradigm used by Song and Schwarz (2009) in an 
effort to clarify the role of favorable affect in explaining the relationship between fluency 
experiences and risk.  In the reported studies, favorable affect and judgments of risk and 
benefit were measured for each experimental condition. The inclusion of these measures 
made apparent the previously overlooked reversal in evaluations due to goal differences.  
A more detailed examination of the data revealed that the relationship between favorable 
affect and risk/benefit perceptions in studies 2 and 3 were consistent with reliance on an 
affect heuristic (Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2007). The results of these studies do 
not contradict those reported by Song and Schwarz (2009), however the additional 
measures make it possible to reach different conclusions and to demonstrate that fluency-
elicited affect does influence perceptions of both risk and benefit. 
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This research makes a number of important theoretical contributions.  In studies 2 
and 3 less fluent processing was shown to increase perceived risk when manipulated 
within subjects.  This effect did not emerge in study 1 using a between subjects 
manipulation of fluency.  Between subjects manipulations of fluency are relatively 
common in the literature (Labroo and Kim 2009; Novemsky et al. 2007; Schwarz et al. 
1991; etc.).  However, studies which have manipulated fluency by varying the ease of 
pronunciation typically use within-subjects manipulations (Alter and Oppenheimer 2006, 
2008; Johnston et al. 1985; Song and Schwarz 2009; Whittlesea and Williams 1998).  
Such within subjects manipulations may be more representative of the situations 
encountered outside the laboratory environment. The contrasting results of study 1 to 
those of studies 2 and 3 suggest that feelings of difficulty derived from ease of 
pronunciation may be more evaluable when compared to other words. Words that are 
similarly difficult to pronounce appear to provide little value as a basis for judgment.   
However, when words that are relatively easy to pronounce are compared with more 
difficult to pronounce words, the relative difficulty of processing is meaningful and 
influences evaluations of those names. This result is consistent with other research 
(Whittlesea and Williams 1998) suggesting that the effects of fluency on familiarity 
judgments is driven by the disconfirmation of expected processing difficulty.  When a 
person encounters a level of processing difficulty that matches their expectations, it is 
uninformative and produces no feelings.  However, when the difficulty of processing 
violates expectations, either by being easier or more difficult than expected, the relative 
difference between expected and experienced processing difficulty provides potentially 
useful information which is used as a basis for judgments.   In situations where no 
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expectations exist, a uniform level of difficulty (as in study 1) is likely to be less 
informative than a comparison between high and low difficulties (as in studies 2 and 3). 
The results of this research also provide initial insight into the role of fluency and 
affect in situations where risk may be seen as desirable.  Risk is commonly 
conceptualized as a negative attribute to be minimized or avoided.  However, in many 
situations, people deliberately seek out risk.  The risk-seeking goals presented to 
participants in the current studies are examples of some of these situations.  Other 
common situations include the risks associated with risk recreation (e.g. hang gliding, sky 
diving, etc.), gambling and certain types of drug use (Machlis and Rosa 1990). The 
results of the current research demonstrated that less fluent processing leads to increased 
perceptions of risk.  However, less fluent ride and medication names were more 
favorably evaluated by risk seekers than by risk avoiders.  Consequently, the relationship 
between favorable affect and risk was found to differ depending on participants’ goals. 
For risk avoiders, favorable affective evaluations and risks were found to be negatively 
related (i.e. more favorable names were perceived as less risky), matching the results of 
previous investigations of the affect heuristic (Finucane et al. 2000).  However, this 
relationship was attenuated among risk seekers. The pattern of results fits what would be 
expected if risks were viewed as being more desirable among risk seekers than for risk 
avoiders.  
The findings therefore, have implications to research on the affect heuristic.  The 
affect heuristic is based on the idea that people consult their overall affective impression 
of an object when making subsequent judgments.  In situations where risk is desirable, 
decision makers consulting their feelings to construct risk judgments would not be 
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expected to report the typical inverse relationship between favorable affective evaluations 
and risk perceptions.  Instead, this relationship is expected to be weak or even positive.  
Previous research has not investigated the role of affect as a basis for judgments in such 
contexts.  Thus, further research is needed to better understand how favorable affective 
evaluations may influence risk perceptions in these situations.  For example, future 
research may explore whether risks of a certain degree and nature are more desirable than 
others among risk seekers. It is likely that even in situations where risk is desirable, 
unnecessary or especially harmful risks may remain objectionable. Future research may 
be able to clarify the nature of desired risk among those with risk-seeking objectives.  
This research also suggests that fluency may serve as one potential input to the 
affect heuristic.  Affect used to inform judgments may come from many sources.  
However, fluency experiences can provide information distinct from the content of 
information that is processed (Schwarz et al. 1991).  The understanding that subjective 
feelings of ease or difficulty produce affect that is then consulted as a basis for 
subsequent judgments helps to address the question of how affective evaluations arise in 
the absence of other potential sources. 
In studies 2 and 3, the effect of fluency on affective evaluations was found to 
depend on participants’ goals.  This finding is in line with other recent research that has 
found that objects that are more effortful to process are perceived as more instrumental 
towards goal achievement, and thus favored (Labroo and Kim 2009).  As previously 
discussed, this relationship was reported only among objects perceived as being useful in 
achieving a goal. Labroo and Kim (2009) reported that advertisements for chocolates that 
were easier to process were preferred over advertisements that were more difficult to 
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process when consumers held neutral or self-control goals.  However, chocolates 
presented with less fluency were preferred if consumers held feel-good goals. Those 
advertisements requiring more effortful processing were desirable among those with feel-
good goals because the chocolates were perceived as being more instrumental in 
achieving the goal of feeling good. However, greater processing difficulty did not lead to 
more favorable evaluations among those with neutral or self-control goals because the 
achievement of those goals conflicted with the benefits offered by the chocolates.   
Although perceived instrumentality of the stimuli was not measured in the current 
research, a similar finding was reported.  Difficult to pronounce ride names and 
medication names were preferred among those with risk-seeking goals.  The difficulty 
associated with pronouncing those names may have caused them to seem more 
instrumental in achieving the goals of identifying the most adventurous rides or the 
strongest medications.  However, the same cannot be said for risk avoiders.   Among 
these individuals, easily pronounced ride and medication names were preferred over 
difficult to pronounce names.  It is not readily apparent why these participants would not 
prefer difficult to pronounce names if processing difficulty is used to infer instrumentality 
during goal pursuit.  For example, risk avoiders in study 3 were instructed to identify the 
safest medications that would be the least likely to cause problems.  If effort is associated 
with goal advancement, difficult to pronounce medications should be preferred.  
However, brand name medications were preferred over more easily pronounced 
medications.  This pattern may imply that increased ease of processing (decreased effort) 
leads to increases in the perceived instrumentality of objects for achieving some types of 
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goals, such as those emphasizing safety or avoidance of uncertainty.  Additional research 
is needed to further explore this possibility. 
Both the design of the experiment and the sample that was used in the third study 
may have contributed to the differences in effects that were observed between the second 
and third study.  For example, it is possible that stronger effects would have been found 
using a different scenario for risk-seeking goals. In the risk-avoidance condition of study 
3 participants were instructed to select the safest medications in order to avoid potential 
side effects.  In the risk-seeking condition, participants were instructed to select the 
strongest and most effective medications.  While these conditions produced effects 
similar to those of study 2, a risk-seeking scenario that referenced side effects or more 
directly the desire to assume risks may have strengthened the results. Additionally, the 
student sample that was used for the third study may have related more readily to the 
rollercoaster context used in the second study than to treatment of serious illnesses that 
was used in the third study. A more diverse sample may be used in future research to 
overcome this limitation. 
The results of this research also have a number of practical implications. Because 
people approach similar situations with different goals, they may reach different 
conclusions from similar experiences.  Goals appear to be capable of influencing which 
naïve theories are selected to make sense of fluency experiences. These naïve theories 
may have profound implications for the inferences people draw from these experiences.  
For example, differences in the application of naïve theories may partially explain why 
complex, difficult processing experiences may be desirable to an expert yet disliked by a 
novice.  In some situations, goals lead to the selection of naïve theories that elicit 
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favorable inferences from more effortful processing. In forming communications, it is 
important to understand how a specific audience might interpret this subjective feeling of 
effort. The goals held by that audience may be one indicator of the naïve theory that will 
be applied to interpret the experience. 
Supporting the findings of Song and Schwarz (2009), perceptions of risk were 
found to be influenced by fluency differences.  This implies that practitioners should be 
aware that difficulty associated with processing information increases perceived risk.  
Knowledge of this relationship may be useful in conveying information in the case of 
health risks.  This application was further emphasized in study 3, as more difficult to 
pronounce (generic) medication names were judged as riskier than more pronounceable 
(brand name) medications within each goal condition. This finding has public policy 
implications because objectively, the medications should have been evaluated similarly 
because they were different names for identical medications.  This result implies that 
advertisements featuring easily pronounced medication names almost certainly produce 
lower perceptions of risk compared to advertisements featuring more difficult to 
pronounce generic equivalents.  Further, unlike the rollercoaster rides used in study 2, 
easily pronounced medication names were preferred over less pronounceable medication 
names in both goal conditions.  This uniform preference for brand name medications 
occurred in the presence of a reversal in perceptions of benefit (difficult to pronounce 
medications were perceived as more beneficial than easy to pronounce medications 
among those with risk-seeking goals, but easy to pronounce medications were perceived 
as more beneficial than difficult to pronounce medications among those with risk-
avoidance goals). While the role of fluency in risk perception of medications is deserving 
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of further study, the current findings suggest that branded medications may be preferred 
over generic equivalents even in situations where generic drugs are perceived as more 
beneficial because they are processed with greater fluency. 
As discussed previously, the findings of this research suggest that affect 
influences risk judgments differently under risk-seeking goal conditions than it does 
under risk-avoidance goal conditions.  When risk is a desirable attribute, risk estimates 
derived from overall affective evaluations may be inflated.  For those communicating 
with participants who engage in activities where risk is desirable, more detailed or 
intimidating wording may have the unintended effect of making those descriptions appear 
more desirable.  Thus, caution is called for to ensure that communications about risk 
produce the appropriate behavioral response.  
Overall, the findings suggest that fluency-elicited affect can help to explain 
subsequent judgments of risk and benefit.  However, the results do not preclude the 
influence that feelings of familiarity may have in shaping risk perceptions.  The results 
reported from the current studies do not contradict those of Song and Schwarz (2009). 
Rather, additional measures make it possible to observe a previously unreported reversal 
in favorable affect that led to a different conclusion from the data. It is possible that both 
affect and familiarity underlie the effects of fluency on perceptions of risk.  As noted by 
Schwarz (2004), the relation between familiarity and favorable affective response is best 
characterized as bidirectional. Thus, while fluency may trigger positive affect that 
influences familiarity (Monin 2003) the converse may also be true that familiarity 
triggers more favorable affective responses.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
In sum, this research has shown that the effect of fluency experiences on 
judgments depends on which naïve theories are brought to bear in an effort to make sense 
of the experience.  Goals appear to be one way that people decide which naïve theories 
are appropriate to apply in a given situation. In support of this idea, the results of the 
current research document a previously unreported reversal in preferences for less 
fluently processed stimuli due to goal differences.  Study 3 replicates these results using 
generic versus brand name medications as a context. The results of these studies also 
demonstrate that favorable affect elicited from fluency experiences may be used to 
explain how people form judgments of risk and benefit, but that these relationships vary 
in association with the desirability of risk.  Finally, the fluency effects observed in the 
current studies emerged only when participants were able to compare easily pronounced 
names to those more difficult to pronounce. The relative nature of fluency judgments is 
deserving of additional study but the findings support the idea that processing 
experiences are not informative unless they diverge from some reference expectation.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The research presented in essay 1 and 2 address research questions relating to the 
affect heuristic and contribute to both the consumer behavior and decision making 
literatures. As a whole, the results suggest that affect can critically inform perceptions of 
risk and benefit associated with novel stimuli. In general, the findings match those that 
would be expected if participants based their responses on an affect heuristic. Especially 
under conditions of uncertainty or when not otherwise motivated, consumers appear to 
readily rely on their overall feeling state when forming judgments. Previous research has 
shown that affect can serve as an important source of information and that it is used as a 
basis for other judgments (Finucane et al. 2000; Ganzach 2000; MacGregor et al. 2000). 
However, these studies are the first to demonstrate that affect underlies intuitive 
judgments of new product attributes. The innovation adoption literature has construed 
these types of judgments as largely analytical in nature. There has also been past research 
demonstrating the potential for fluency experiences to produce affective reactions.  
Again, however, the current studies are the first to demonstrate that fluency-elicited affect 
can inform judgments of the risks and benefits associated with different stimuli. 
The first essay was motivated by the question of how affect influences consumer 
judgments of risk and benefit associated with new products. Although recognized as an 
inherently uncertain context, the innovation adoption literature has largely maintained a 
analytical perspective on how consumers make decisions about new products (Wood and 
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Moreau 2006). However, research suggests that heuristic decision making styles may be 
influential or potentially dominant in conditions of high uncertainty. Specifically, the 
affect heuristic (Finucane et al. 2000) suggests that in many situations, people perceive 
risks and benefits to be inversely related.  This inverse relationship occurs because 
perceptions of both risk and benefit are derived from a common underlying affective 
evaluation (like/dislike). Liking an object promotes a favorable assessment of benefits, 
and a deflated assessment of risks. Disliking produces the opposite pattern.  Drawing 
from this research, the first essay presented four studies examining the relationship 
between affective evaluations of new products and consumer judgments of risk and 
benefit.  
The first study demonstrated that participants, if allowed to form judgments without 
any instruction or when placed under conditions which favored heuristic processing 
styles, perceived the familiar inverse relationship between risk and benefit across a 
variety of new products.  The results indicate that affect may function as a common basis 
for judgments of these products supporting previous research (Peters 2006).  Further 
support for the affect heuristic was found by considering an additional group of 
participants who were encouraged to use a more analytical decision making style as they 
considered the risks and benefits associated with the new products.  Among these 
participants, the perceived relationship between perceived risk and benefit was 
attenuated.  This pattern is consistent with prior research suggesting that affective 
decision making processes are used by default when forming judgments, but that people 
are capable of using more analytical decision making styles in certain situations (Pham et 
al. 2001; Slovic et al. 2010).  
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The second study further tested the way in which affect is used to inform judgments 
of risk and benefit by manipulating the information provided to participants and 
measuring changes in risk and benefit perceptions. Underlying this study was the idea 
that information provided about the risks associated with some product, objectively, does 
not provide information about the benefits associated with a product. However, if people 
form their judgments of risk and benefit using their overall affective evaluation, 
information about one attribute should influence perceptions of the other. The analysis 
from study two indicated that participants perceived changes to the non-manipulated 
attribute, despite not receiving any information about that attribute. In addition, changes 
in the non-manipulated were generally opposite (and affectively congruent) to that of the 
manipulated attribute. For example, information that lowered risk perceptions tended to 
increase benefit perceptions because the latter were derived from a positive affective 
response to the former.  
The third study of the first essay was similar to the second study. However, in the 
third study, affective evaluations were manipulated independent of information about 
either risks or benefits. The prediction was that if people relied on affect to form their 
evaluations, then more polarized affective evaluations (I love it / I hate it) relative to 
neutral evaluations (neither like nor dislike) should produce greater differences in risk 
and benefit perceptions. The analysis supported this hypothesis and indicated that more 
(versus less) affectively extreme evaluations corresponded with greater differences in 
perceived risk and benefit.   
The final study of the first essay sought to determine if product level characteristics 
might moderate the use of the affect heuristic. The study addressed the hypothesis that 
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consumers may be more likely to rely on affect when making judgments of more hedonic 
products, but that they may be less likely to rely on affect when making judgments of 
more utilitarian products. In addition to these dimensions, the fourth study examined 
other factors including product radicalness, aesthetic appeal, product understanding and 
category knowledge to test if any might moderate the reliance on affect when making 
judgments of risk and benefit. The results found no evidence that any of the measured 
product-level attributes moderated the use of the affect heuristic. The finding again, 
suggests that affect may be used by default when forming new product judgments. 
The second essay extended the findings of the first by considering the role of 
fluency as an input to the affect heuristic and subsequent risk and benefit judgments.  
Fluency relates to the subjective ease or difficulty associated with processing 
information.  Research has shown that differences in processing difficulty influence a 
variety of judgments with the general finding that more fluent processing leads to more 
favorable evaluations (Reber et al. 2004; Reber et al. 1998; Winkielman and Cacioppo 
2001). Song and Schwarz (2009) reported that fluency experiences influence perceived 
risk because of familiarity differences and not because of affect resulting from fluency 
experiences.  The second essay re-evaluated these findings to determine if favorable 
affect elicited in response to processing experiences might also be related to perceptions 
of risk. 
The three studies presented in the second essay were each variations of the 
methodology outlined by Song and Schwarz (2009).  However, each of the experiments 
reported in the second essay also included additional measures that were not included in 
the original study.  In the first study of essay 2, participants were presented either risk-
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seeking or risk-avoidance goals as well as either easy or difficult to pronounce 
rollercoaster ride names in a fully between subjects design. This design was different than 
the original Song and Schwarz (2009) study in which fluency was manipulated within 
subjects. The between subjects design was selected to help further understand the nature 
of fluency judgments. Surprisingly, the results of the first study were largely non-
significant and failed to replicate those reported by Song and Schwarz (2009). The 
second study was identical to the first with the exception that fluency was manipulated 
within subjects. All participants were presented with both easy and difficult to pronounce 
ride names. The findings of the second study replicated those of Song and Schwarz 
(2009) but also revealed a previously unreported reversal in preference for less fluent 
stimuli among those with risk-seeking goals. The analysis further revealed that favorable 
affective evaluations corresponded with increased perceptions of benefits and decreased 
perceptions of risk as predicted by the affect heuristic. However, the strength of the 
relationship between favorable affect, risk and benefit varied as a function of both goals 
and fluency.  
The third study further validated the findings of the second study in a different 
context, using brand name (more fluent) versus generic (less fluent) medications as a 
manipulation of fluency. The results aligned closely with those of the second study, and 
offered further support for the role of fluency-elicited affect as a basis for risk and benefit 
judgments. The findings from the studies presented in the second essay do not contradict 
those reported by Song and Schwarz (2009). However, the inclusion of additional 
measures, not used in the original study, made it possible to reach different conclusions.  
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Together the studies from both essays extend previous research on the affect 
heuristic. The studies suggest that people often rely on affect as a heuristic to help 
construct other judgments even when confronted with novel stimuli. The use of novel 
stimuli in both essays ensured that observed risk and benefit judgments were not based on 
the retrieval of previously formed evaluations. Admittedly, the situations employed in 
these studies were shrouded in uncertainty. Such contexts favor heuristic processing 
styles because they simplify the decision making task (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  
Although limited information was provided to participants in these studies, the relative 
lack of information did not preclude the use of more analytical processing styles. Indeed, 
the first study of the first essay demonstrated that if participants are encouraged to 
analytically consider the risks and benefits associated with a new product, the influence 
of their overall affective evaluation is reduced as evidenced by the attenuated inverse 
relationship between perceptions of risks and benefits. The participants in the analytical 
condition received no additional information relative to those in the control or cognitive 
load conditions. Even when provided with additional information, such as in the second 
study of the first essay, participants appeared to rely on changes in affective evaluations 
to form judgments of the non-manipulated attributes. Across the studies in both essays, 
participants were found to readily rely upon affect to make judgments. 
The studies in the second essay suggested fluency might serve as one source of 
affect upon which to base subsequent judgments.   The null results observed using 
between subjects manipulation of fluency (study 1) provide additional insight into the 
way in which fluency perceptions are incorporated so as to elicit affective reactions.  The 
findings suggest that fluency-elicited affect may arise as the result of a comparative 
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process rather than as the result of an absolute judgment. This observation supports 
previous research that has found fluency effects arising from the disconfirmation of 
expectations (Whittlesea and Williams 1998, 2000). The second essay makes a similar 
assertion but demonstrates a comparative effect in a situation in which expectations are 
not pre-established. Instead, expectations appear to be constructed relative to other 
experiences of fluency in the within subjects conditions. Recent research has shown that 
people are more biased by relative judgments when they rely on intuitive over analytical 
reasoning (Saini and Thota 2010). Manipulations that influence processing differences 
may be one avenue for future research.  
Beyond fluency, other sources of information can undoubtedly serve as inputs to 
the affect heuristic. Chief among these, the content of information that is processed will 
elicit affective reactions. Even when confronted with novel stimuli, associations are 
drawn from memory that may be laced with feelings that can subsequently inform 
judgments. However, these associations are likely to be idiosyncratic and difficult to 
predict.  For example, the Uno Bike included in the first essay is similar to traditional 
motorcycles in appearance, but it balances like a Segway (see appendix A). A consumer 
evaluating this product may draw on associations between either motorcycles or Segway 
vehicles but the valence of the affect arising from either is likely to depend on previous 
experiences. Whereas one person evaluating the Uno Bike may have been raised in a 
family of avid motorcyclists, another may have known a close friend who died in a 
motorcycle accident. Thus, the valence of associations derived from the content of 
thoughts may be difficult to predict.  In contrast, fluency relates to the ease or difficulty 
associated with processing information and can inform judgments independent of the 
 123 
 
 
content that processed (Schwarz et al. 1991). Differences in the ease of processing has 
been shown to produce remarkably similar effects on many types of judgments (Alter and 
Oppenheimer 2009). Thus, difficulty associated with information processing may provide 
a more reliable, if not necessarily dominant, effect on affective evaluations relative to the 
content of information processed. 
Adding further complexity, the second essay demonstrates that preference for less 
fluent stimuli can reverse depending upon salient goals. People holding risk-seeking 
(versus risk-avoidance) goals evaluated names that were difficult to pronounce more 
favorably.  Empirical demonstrations of reversals in the interpretation of fluency are 
relatively uncommon and new in the fluency literature (Briñol et al. 2006; Tsai and 
McGill 2011). However, existing research does suggest that less fluent processing may 
lead to favorable evaluations during goal pursuit (Labroo and Kim 2009) as less fluently 
processed objects may be perceived as more instrumental to fulfilling a goal. Evidence 
supporting this observation was found in the second essay for those holding risk-seeking 
goals, but not for those holding risk-avoidance goals. Additional research is needed to 
help clarify situations in which less fluent processing is associated with increased 
perceptions of instrumentality.  The risk-avoidance goals used in the second essay may 
represent a boundary condition to the instrumentality heuristic.  That is, when pursuing 
goals related to safety or avoidance of uncertainty, more fluently processed objects may 
be perceived as more instrumental relative to more difficult to process objects.  
The relationship between affect and risk perceptions for those with risk-seeking 
goals has not been explored by previous research on the affect heuristic. Individuals 
holding risk-seeking goals are likely to perceive certain risks as desirable.  As such, if 
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affect were consulted when forming risk judgments, more favorable evaluations may not 
be associated with judgments of reduced risk. Such a pattern was observed in studies 2 
and 3 of the second essay. Although, the relationship between affective evaluations and 
perceptions of benefit was observed to differ as a function of fluency, it remained 
constant across goal conditions.  In contrast, the relationship between affective 
evaluations and perceptions of risk varied both as a function of goals and differences in 
fluency.  The result matches what would be expected if participants turned to affect to 
construct judgments of risk and benefit.  However, additional research is needed to 
clarify how affect is used to inform judgments of risk in situations in which risk is 
desirable.  
One interesting extension using the methods presented in this dissertation may be to 
replicate the second and third studies of the first essay among participants holding risk-
seeking goals.  The finding that more affectively extreme evaluations correspond with 
smaller differences in risk and benefit perceptions among those with risk-avoidance goals 
(a reversal to the current findings) would provide further evidence that these perceptions 
are based on affect even in situations where risk is desirable.  Further, information 
provided that serves to increase perceived risk (as in study 2 of essay 1) should produce 
increased benefit perceptions in situations where risks are desirable.  If such a 
relationship is found, it may be possible to gain further insight into the nature of the 
relationship between affect and risk perceptions by exploring those situations in which 
increased risk fails to trigger increased benefit perceptions. It is likely that even in 
situations where risk is desirable, unnecessary or especially harmful risks may remain 
objectionable. A better understanding of the way in which affect is related to risk 
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perceptions in situations where risk is desirable may have a number of applications for 
marketers and for public policy.  
Other extensions of the studies presented in this dissertation may yield interesting 
results.  For example, study 4 of the first essay asked participants to rate the utilitarian 
and hedonic attributes of 16 new products.  Then, the four most highly rated products 
were compared to the four lowest rated products within each category.  This approach has 
some limitations.  For example, products in either group may have differed on other 
dimensions besides their hedonic nature.  Many products can be both utilitarian and 
hedonic, whereas others may be predominantly hedonic, or neither. Identifying product 
innovations that are uniquely hedonic or utilitarian poses a challenge. Additionally, the 
products that fell into the high and low hedonic groups may have not been considered as 
such if a wider variety of products had been considered.  That is, the products that 
representing highly hedonic products in this study may have not been considered highly 
hedonic within a broader context.  Future research may consider manipulating the 
information about the type of benefits provided by a product, rather than measuring the 
inherent attributes of the product.  For example, participants could be given information 
about either the utilitarian or hedonic benefits offered by a product.  Such a manipulation 
would allow the same product to be used in both conditions, controlling for other 
differences between products that may confound the results. Affect may be more relevant 
to decisions about a new product that is expected to deliver experiential benefits (e.g., 
fun/enjoyment) whereas affect may be less relevant for decisions about an innovation 
which will have instrumental uses (e.g., used for work; Pham 1998; Pham and Avnet 
2009). 
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Future research could also explore other goals and additional methods of assigning 
goals.  For example, goals of variety or consistency-seeking may also influence which 
naïve theories are selected to interpret fluency experiences.  Less fluent stimuli may be 
favored among those seeking variety if increased processing difficulty is interpreted as a 
reflection of the object’s novelty.  The way that goals are assigned to participants could 
also be varied.  In the studies reported in the second essay, participants were asked to 
imagine that they held specific goals.  However, goals could also be manipulated through 
priming procedures. One possibility would be to adapt a paradigm used by Shen and 
Wyer (2010) who found that consumers tend to rely on decision strategies used to make 
previous decisions.  For example, if people make a series of varied decisions in one 
domain (e.g. shopping for juice drinks) they are likely to seek variety in subsequent 
decisions (e.g. the variety of shoes worn in a week).  Thus, goals of variety or 
consistency-seeking may be primed by asking participants to make varied or consistent 
decisions in a separate study before confronting the focal stimuli.  
Other situations may also prime goals.  For example, when confronted with a 
possible loss, people tend to become more risk-seeking and when confronted with a gain 
people are more likely to avoid risk (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Future research may 
explore this tendency as a way in which to prime different goals.  Would participants who 
are confronted with a potential loss prefer stock ticker symbols that are more difficult to 
pronounce over those that are easier to pronounce?  Such results would provide a 
boundary condition for existing research that suggests that more fluent stock tickers are 
preferred (Alter and Oppenheimer 2006) and would have important practical 
implications. 
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The research presented in this dissertation can be extended in a number of other 
directions as well.  The first essay demonstrates that the affect heuristic explains how 
consumers make judgments about the risks and benefits associated with new products.  
The second essay suggests that fluency experiences serve as one input to the affect 
heuristic.  Additional research may wish to consider if the affect heuristic influences the 
type of information that is attended to and ultimately, choice behavior.  Previous research 
on the affect heuristic has used social hazards, such as nuclear power or pesticides, about 
which people are likely to have established attitudes (Alhakami and Slovic 1994; 
Finucane et al. 2000).  In contrast, the affective evaluations formed in the current 
research were in response to novel stimuli and were based upon sparse information.  
They were, therefore, likely to be relatively unstable and easily manipulated (as 
evidenced in study 2 and 3 of essay 1). These initial impressions, however, could be 
important and influence behavior by biasing the type of information to which people 
choose to attend.   For example, initial affective evaluations may predict whether people 
choose to read favorable or unfavorable review.  This information may then reinforce the 
original feeling.  A number of other individual and situational variables might moderate 
which information is selected. The current research could be extended even further to 
explore the ability of affect to predict trial or actual purchase decisions involving new 
products relative to cognitions.  This research may show, for example, that early affective 
evaluations are more predictive of trial behavior than cognitive evaluations of the same 
products (Dempsey and Mitchell 2010). 
As a whole, the research presented in this dissertation makes a number of 
contributions to existing literatures, but also offers avenues for continued exploration. 
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Across two essays composed of seven total studies (with additional pre-tests), this work 
demonstrates that our feelings often serve as the basis for constructing judgments and 
making inferences in uncertain situations.  Both the antecedents that produce these 
feelings and the way in which these feelings impact subsequent judgments were 
considered.  The results complement existing theory but also challenge established 
perspectives and foster additional research questions. 
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APPENDIX A 
INNOVATION STIMULI  
 
 Innovation Picture Description 
1 Vaccine Strips 
 
These are thin, 
dissolving strips 
similar to breath 
fresheners, which 
are used to 
vaccinate infants.  
The strips dissolve 
in the infant’s 
mouth and also 
stick to the roof of 
the mouth so that 
the vaccine cannot 
be spit out. 
2 Uno Bike 
 
A self-balancing 
motorcycle with 
only one wheel. 
3 Solar Phone 
 
A cellular phone 
that can be 
recharged using a 
solar back panel. 
4 
Children's 
Training 
TriCycle 
 
As the child rides 
faster on this 
tricycle, the back 
wheels are drawn 
together to allow 
the child to balance 
like a bicycle.  
When the child 
slows down, the 
wheels spread back 
out for stability like 
a tricycle. 
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5 Power Mat 
 
Electronics placed 
on this mat can be 
inductively charged 
without having to 
be plugged into the 
wall.  The mat is 
compatible with 
existing 
electronics. 
6 Fruit Bowl 
   
A pocketed bowl 
that expands to 
hold fruit. 
7 
Sliding 
Door 
Refrigerator 
  
Rather than 
traditional doors, 
food items are 
stored in 
compartments, 
which slide out on 
rails.  Each 
compartment is 
sealed to decrease 
the loss of cold air. 
8 Dog Bowl 
 
This dog food bowl 
partitions food into 
four zones that help 
to slow down how 
fast a dog can eat 
their food. 
9 Cord Lock Light 
 
A waterproof LED 
flashlight 
combined with a 
cord lock for 
attaching to 
outdoor gear. 
10 Bottle Cooler 
 
A rechargeable 
cooler that chills 
individual bottles. 
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11 
Composting 
Garbage 
Disposal 
  
A garbage disposal 
that collects food 
waste for 
composting. 
12 
In-Line 
Water 
Meter 
 
A water meter that 
tracks water 
consumption at the 
point of use. 
13 Solar Blinds 
 
These blinds have 
solar panels that 
face the window 
and a led light 
strips directed into 
the house.  They 
charge by 
absorbing solar 
energy during the 
day and illuminate 
to provide light in 
the evening. 
14 Bike Light 
 
This battery 
powered bike light 
projects a lane 
around the rider. 
15 Simple GPS 
 
This device allows 
the user to mark a 
location, then will 
point back to that 
location. 
16 
Recessed 
Light to 
Pedant 
Light 
Converter 
  
This light fixture 
installs over 
existing recessed 
light cans to 
convert them to 
pendant lights. 
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APPENDIX B 
RISK AND BENEFIT INFORMATION: STUDY 2  
Innovation Condition Information 
Power Mat 
High Risk 
The power mat has significant safety concerns.   Because 
the system charges through induction it produces heat in 
the device being recharged.  The heat produced will not 
damage the device because the adapters are built with a 
heat shield facing the device.  However, it is not possible 
to shield the side facing down toward the mat which can 
make the device uncomfortably hot if it is picked up mid 
charge without being allowed to cool. 
Low Risk 
The Power Mat technology has been evaluated in a 
number of independent studies involving many 
households.  Each of these studies have concluded that 
the device is safe for users and the devices being charged. 
The Power Mat has also been safety tested to meet both 
UL and CE electrical standards for consumer electronics. 
Both of these certifications require safeguards in the 
charging circuitry and include extensive testing to ensure 
that the device will not overheat or cause harm to users. 
The product is also back by a 3-year warranty. 
High Benefit 
The Power Mat has a number of advantages over wall 
chargers.  For example, it eliminates the need for large 
“wall worts” and the cords associated with each 
electronic device.  In addition, the inductive charging 
method used by the Power Mat is also a more 
environmentally friendly option because it is more 
efficient than the AC to DC conversion required to 
charge batteries with normal chargers.  Finally, the 
technology works with almost any existing mobile device 
including laptop computers, mp3 players, phones, 
Bluetooth headsets, GPS systems, and portable gaming 
devices. 
Low Benefit 
The Power Mat serves essentially the same function as 
existing wall chargers that come with every rechargeable 
device.  In addition, electronic devices recharge in about 
the same amount of time that it takes conventional 
devices to charge. 
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Innovation Condition Information 
Simple GPS 
High Risk 
There are a number of risks associated with using this 
GPS system.   For example, the device has a short, 30-
day limited warranty. In addition users have reported that 
the device is easy to loose because it is so small.  Some 
people have reported that this device ran out of battery 
before they returned to their marked destination. There 
have also been reports of more “hardcore” outdoor 
enthusiasts making fun of people who use such a simple 
GPS. 
Low Risk 
This GPS system features a weather-resistant 
construction that stands up to the rigors of outdoor use.  
The product is backed by a 3-year warranty from a 
reputable manufacturer.  A lanyard is included with the 
device so that it can be tied to a jacket or pack to ensure 
that it is not lost.  Finally, the battery life has been 
reported to be very good, lasting around 36-hours of 
continuous use. 
High Benefit 
Many people could benefit from using a Simple GPS 
system. While most GPS systems are complicated to use 
and present information in a way that is confusing, this 
device always points back to the destination that was 
marked so hikers can find their way back to camp, or 
families can find their car in an oversized parking lot.  In 
addition this GPS is easy enough for parents to send with 
children and small enough to fit in a pocket. 
Low Benefit 
This device lacks many of the features of other handheld 
GPS systems, while costing almost as much.  For 
example, the device does not show what path you took to 
get to a point but only an arrow indicating the direction 
from your current position to the point that was marked.   
In many situations, a direct line is not the best path to 
take. It is also only possible to store one point to return to 
at time.  Finally, this device cannot be connected to a 
computer so there is no way upload waypoints or 
download any route information.  
 134 
 
 
Innovation Condition Information 
Vaccine 
Strips 
 
High Risk 
 
These vaccine strips carry a number of risks compared to 
injections or medications.  For example, the person 
giving the strip to the child risks touching both the strip 
and the inside of the child’s mouth, both of which could 
spread disease.  There are also safety concerns because 
the dosage is difficult to adjust.  In some instances there 
have been reports of children gagging if the strip is 
incorrectly positioned in the child’s mouth. 
 
Low Risk 
 
These vaccine strips are a safe alternative to injections or 
medications. The strips have been certified by both the 
FDA, in the United States and the EMEA, in the 
European Union to be safe for delivering a wide variety 
of different drugs and to be compliant with safe 
prescription manufacturing practices.  In addition, a 
number of independent studies have found no adverse 
side effects to using these strips. 
 
High Benefit 
 
These vaccine strips provide a number of benefits over 
injections or medications.  For example, they are painless 
and easy to administer. Also, because children cannot spit 
them out, they ensure that the child gets the correct and 
full dosage.   
 
Low Benefit 
 
These vaccine strips have very few advantages over 
injections or medications that are already used to deliver 
vaccines.  Most parents find pills or syrups to be just as 
easy to administer as these strips.  Also, vaccinations 
delivered using vaccine strips have been shown to be no 
more effective than those delivered using other delivery 
methods. 
 
 
  
 135 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: STUDIES 2 AND 3  
 
The results of studies 2 and 3 were analyzed using a mixed model hierarchical 
linear regression analysis following the within-subject contrast approach for repeated 
measures models outlined by Judd (2000). The regression analysis used for the first study 
was not appropriate for studies 2 and 3 because fluency, in these studies, was 
manipulated within subjects. Additionally, an ANCOVA analysis was not appropriate 
because the within subjects measure of favorable affect was expected to interact with 
goals and fluency. The within subjects regression analysis however allows for continuous 
variables measured at each level of the within subjects factor to be included in the 
regression models along with potential interactions between those variables and other 
manipulated variables of interest.  
The first step in the analysis was the coding of the between subjects factor (goal).  
In studies 2 and 3 participants were assigned to either a risk-seeking or a risk-avoidance 
goal. Thus, only a single set of contrast-coded predictors were needed to represent the 
two levels.  The contrast weights were 1 for those assigned risk-seeking goals and -1 for 
those assigned risk-avoidance goals. 
In studies 2 and 3 fluency was manipulated within subjects and has two levels.  
Therefore, the analysis requires two regression equations, one that considers a within 
subjects contrast of fluency and another using the average level of fluency. To test for the 
effect of goals and fluency on favorable affective evaluations, W variables were 
calculated to represent the dependent variables following Judd (2000).  
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To analyze the effects of goals and fluency on favorable affective evaluations W0i 
was calculated. This variable represented the average favorable affective evaluation of 
the names for each participant across fluency conditions. W1i represents the difference in 
favorable affective evaluations between the easy to pronounce and difficult to pronounce 
names. These W scores were regressed onto the contrast-coded variable representing the 
goal condition to which participants were assigned, creating the regression equations 
shown below:  
 
W0i = b00 + b01Xi 
 
W1i = b10 + b11Xi 
 
In these regression equations, b00 is the intercept value. The term b01 tests if the average 
favorability evaluation is different for those assigned to risk-seeking or risk-avoidance 
goal conditions. Thus, b01 represents the main effect of goals on favorable affect. In the 
second equation, b10 estimates the difference in favorable affect between fluency 
conditions on average across goals and represents the main effect of fluency on favorable 
affect. Finally, b11 tests if the difference in favorable affect varies as a function of goals 
and represents the interaction between goals and fluency on favorable affect. 
An analysis of the effects of goals, processing difficulty and favorable affect on 
benefit and risk also followed the regression analysis described by Judd (2000). Again, 
two regression equations were needed for each dependent variable (risk and benefit). W0i 
represents the average benefit (risk) reported by each participant across fluency 
(1) 
(2) 
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conditions. W1i represents the difference in benefit (risk) between easy to pronounce and 
difficult to pronounce ride names. In addition, two within subjects variables were 
calculated to account for the influence of favorable affect on benefit (risk).  WS0i 
represented the mean favorable affective evaluation across fluency conditions for each 
participant. WS1i represented the difference in favorable affect between the fluency 
conditions for each participant.  Each of these within subject predictors was centered to 
reduce multicollinearity. Two interaction terms (XiWS0i and XiWS1i) were also 
calculated to evaluate the interaction between average favorable affective evaluations and 
goals (b03) and the interaction between differences in favorable affective evaluations 
between easy and difficult to pronounce ride names and goals (b13). Each of the benefit 
(risk) W scores was regressed onto the contrast-coded goal condition variable (Xi) and 
the matching within subjects favorable affect measures (WS0i and WS1i). The regression 
equations are shown below:  
 
W0i = b00 + b01Xi + b02WS0i + b03Xi *WS0i 
 
W1i = b10 + b11Xi + b12WS1i + b13Xi *WS1i 
 
As in equations 1 and 2 described above b00, b01, b10, and  b11 in equations 3 and 4 
represent the intercept, main effects of goals, main effects of fluency and goals x fluency 
interaction respectively on the dependent measures (risk or benefit).  In addition, b02 
represents the main effects of favorable affective evaluations on the dependent measures 
(risk or benefit). Additional interactions between favorable affective evaluations, goals 
(3) 
(4) 
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and fluency are represented by b03, b12, and  b13. The interaction between favorable affect 
and goals is represented by b03. The coefficient b12 represents the extent to which 
differences in benefit (risk) between fluency conditions depends on differences in 
favorable affect between fluency conditions and thus represents the interaction between 
favorable affect and fluency. Finally, the coefficient b13 captures the interaction between 
favorable affect differences between easy and difficult to pronounce ride names and goals 
on dependent measure (risk or benefit) differences between easy and difficult to 
pronounce ride names.  It provides information about whether favorable affect 
differences between the two fluency conditions are more predictive of the dependent 
measure (risk or benefit) differences in one goal condition than in the other. Thus, this 
term represents the interaction between favorable affect, goals and fluency. Table 6 in the 
second essay presents these regression coefficients for studies 2 and 3.  
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